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MIRANDIZING FAMILY JUSTICE
JANE K. STOEVER†
Family Justice Centers, which co-locate governmental and community
responses to domestic violence, are rapidly proliferating sites at which survi-
vor autonomy is frequently in tension with state intervention. Abuse survi-
vors often benefit from being able to access multiple services in one
location, but the presence of mandatory reporters at the Centers, along with
the Centers’ criminal justice locus, can create unanticipated criminal justice
and governmental involvement, monitoring, and control, contrary to the help
survivors expect to receive. Although the Centers are typically advertised as
“confidential,” most of the service providers—including police, prosecu-
tors, safety advocates, and medical personnel—are mandatory reporters of
abuse who can initiate criminal or protective services cases. As the Family
Justice Center model propagates, it is imperative that the Centers’ goals of
empowering and supporting survivors be paramount. Abuse survivors should
be counseled about the implications of providing information to the various
governmental and community agents with whom they come into contact so
that they understand all possible consequences of their statements and are
able to make more informed choices. Survivors can essentially be
“Mirandized” or provided with tailored information from Attorney Naviga-
tors to enhance their safety, autonomy, and available options. Such warnings
could salvage the noble intentions of Family Justice Centers and protect sur-
vivors’ constitutional privacy rights while disarming the State from using
survivors’ information in ways contrary to their wishes and well-being.
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INTRODUCTION
After experiencing years of domestic violence, Emma sees an advertise-
ment for her local Family Justice Center, a “safe, friendly, and confidential
place” to get help from abuse. When she arrives, Emma is offered a range of
services, and she requests medical care. Emma is routed to a forensic nurse
examiner who is an employee of the Police Department. When the nurse sees
Emma’s bruises, she asks whether Emma’s children were at home during the
violence and informs Emma that the nurse must make a police report and
notify Child Protective Services. To Emma’s dismay, this results in the crimi-
nal prosecution of Emma’s husband and a neglect case against Emma for
failing to protect her children from being exposed to abuse.1
1 The vignettes in this Article are based on actual experiences of abuse survivors in
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Two major objectives animate the State’s approach to domestic vio-
lence:2 (1) protecting abuse victims from further violence and (2) identify-
ing, holding accountable, and punishing abuse perpetrators.3 Even while the
State is acting in its helping role, it maintains police powers it does not wish
to relinquish, such as its reporting, monitoring, and punishment functions.
The State’s objectives are thus often in tension from a survivor’s perspective,
especially when a survivor seeks help ending abuse but resists criminal jus-
tice or child welfare involvement.
Family Justice Centers, which co-locate governmental and community
responses to domestic violence to serve victims in one location,4 are a prolif-
erating site at which survivors experience the dueling state roles. Regarding
the Centers as state apparatuses, the Family Justice Center concept was de-
vised by prosecutors, police and prosecutors are a foundational part of each
Center, the Centers are often governmental entities,5 and some Centers are
jurisdictions with Family Justice Centers, as told to the Author by attorneys around the
country. Names have been changed to protect confidentiality.
2 Domestic violence can be understood as an intimate partner’s systematic use of
violence, threat of violence, or coercive behavior to induce fear and to gain and maintain
power and control over another. For an overview of scholarly and legal definitions of
domestic violence, see LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 30–53 (2012); EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN
ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 198–211 (2007).
Domestic violence is an exceedingly prevalent and dangerous occurrence, with nearly
one in three teenage girls and women in the United States and globally experiencing
physical or sexual abuse during her lifetime. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Global and Regional
Estimates of Violence Against Women: Prevalence and Health Effects of Intimate Partner
Violence and Non-Partner Sexual Violence 1, 2 (2013), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
10665/85239/1/9789241564625_eng.pdf?ua=1 [http://perma.cc/58XZ-ADE5]; cf. Marie
L. Crandall et al., Predicting Future Injury Among Women in Abusive Relationships, 56 J.
TRAUMA INJURY INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 906, 906 (2004) (finding that forty-four
percent of women who were murdered by their intimate partner had received emergency
room treatment within two years of the homicide and that nearly all had at least one
emergency room visit for domestic violence injuries); Jane Koziol-McLain et al., Predic-
tive Validity of a Screen for Partner Violence Against Women, 21 AM. J. PREVENTIVE
MED. 93, 98–99 (2001) (finding that women who have experienced past intimate partner
violence are at “heightened risk” for continuing violence, a conclusion that is consistent
with the “well-known pattern of repeated abuse that many women endure”).
3 See Proclamation No. 8575, 75 Fed. Reg. 62303, 62303 (Oct. 1, 2010) (“Our law
enforcement and justice system must work to hold offenders accountable and to protect
victims and their children.”); White House Office of Communication, Radio Address
Paper on Combating Violence Against Women, President Clinton’s Radio Address to the
Nation: Legislation to Combat Violence Against Women, Fight Trafficking in Persons,
and Assist Victims of Terrorism (Oct. 30, 2000), 2000 WL 1617213, at *1 (“These key
provisions [of the Violence Against Women Act] provide critical new protections for
battered immigrants, by helping them escape abuse and by holding batterers accounta-
ble.”); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2014) (explaining that the intent of the
legislature in passing the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was to “assure the victims
of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide” and to
require that the State provide access to “emergent and long-term civil and criminal reme-
dies and sanctions”).
4 See Casey Gwinn et al., The Family Justice Center Collaborative Model, 27 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 79, 80–83 (2007).
5 Id. at 82, 109 (identifying how the model was created by three prosecutors and
providing the example of the Crystal Judson Family Justice Center in Pierce County,
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located within police departments.6 For undocumented immigrant victims;
survivors whose abusive partners are law enforcement; victims who have
outstanding warrants for their arrest; lesbian, gay, or transgender survivors
who have had negative interactions with law enforcement; and other com-
munities that have experienced police brutality, the Centers’ criminal justice
locus serves as an entry barrier.7
While the Centers are typically advertised as being “confidential” help-
ing places,8 most of the service providers—including police, prosecutors,
safety advocates, and medical personnel—are mandatory reporters of vari-
ous forms of abuse.9 For example, medical personnel are mandated to report
child, teen, and elder abuse, and in many states they are also mandatory
reporters of intimate partner violence.10 Once a doctor, nurse, or other medi-
cal professional learns information about abuse, he or she is required to
make reports to law enforcement and protective agencies.11 The resultant
outcome is that just as a victimized parent is seeking medical care and help
to end violence, his or her children may be removed from that parent’s care,
and the victim’s parental rights may be terminated for “failing to protect”
Washington, which is a “governmental entity” where the director and assistant director
were hired from within the government).
6 See, e.g., TULSA FAM. SAFETY CTR., http://www.fsctulsa.org [http://perma.cc/
Q2WS-JHD2] (noting the Family Justice center is located in the “Main Floor Police
Courts Building,” so that victims must pass through doors labeled Police Department to
access the Center); Bill Lansdowne & Casey Gwinn, Lifesaving Leadership to Break the
Cycle of Family Violence: Partnership Between Law Enforcement and Communities, THE
POLICE CHIEF (Oct. 2013), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuse
action=display_arch&article_id=3154&issue_id=102013 [http://perma.cc/R33U-
8JUT] (“With more than 30 Family Justice Centers that are led by law enforcement
agencies, the crucial role of law enforcement leadership in advocating for such centers
and leading the effort to create centers in local communities is clear.”).
7 See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the
Legal System, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51 (2013) (exploring barriers transgender
victims of intimate partner violence face when seeking help, particularly given the struc-
tural and institutional violence and discrimination transgender people face); Leigh Good-
mark, Hands Up At Home: Militarized Masculinity and Police Officers Who Commit
Intimate Partner Abuse, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (questioning the wis-
dom of America’s reliance on the criminal justice system to adequately respond to inti-
mate partner violence when law enforcement disproportionately commits domestic
violence).
8 See, e.g., Let Us Help, FAM. JUST. CTR. OF OUACHITA PAR. (LA), http://yourfjc.org/
let-us-help/ [http://perma.cc/G3CJ-A5YV] (“All services are free and confidential.”);
Mission and Values, FAM. JUST. CTR. OF ERIE CTY. (NY), http://www.fjcsafe.org/family-
justice-center/Mission-&-Values/1 [http://perma.cc/MFB6-Z8SE] (identifying the cen-
ter’s core values as “zero tolerance for domestic violence and absolute confidentiality for
our clients”); NAMPA FAM. JUST. CTR. (ID), http://www.cityofnampa.us/index.aspx?nid=
471 [http://perma.cc/R4LZ-TR4X] (“[W]e keep everything you tell us in the strictest
confidence, and don’t share your information without your permission.”). For a complete
list of existing Centers that prominently identify their services as confidential, see Appen-
dix A.
9 Infra Part II.
10 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West
2014).
11
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135.
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children from being exposed to domestic violence.12 Similarly, criminal jus-
tice involvement impacts not only the defendant, but also the entire family,
given the employment, housing, immigration, relational, and other conse-
quences of criminal convictions.13 Thus, both the protective and punitive
guises of the State are problematic and damaging to abuse survivors. In a
setting advertised as “safe, confidential and friendly,”14 survivors have no
reason to expect such reporting requirements. The prominence and conse-
quences of mandatory reporters and criminal justice system actors in Family
Justice Centers should be mitigated through adequate counseling, disclo-
sures, and opportunities for informed decision-making.
Even beyond mandatory reporting requirements, state agents and pro-
fessionals often view survivors as having diminished capacity and substitute
their judgment for that of abuse survivors.15 Thus, providing information at a
Family Justice Center can result in criminal justice, Child Protective Ser-
vices, or Adult Protective Services involvement, any of which visits multiple
consequences on individuals, relationships, and families.16
As Family Justice Centers multiply around the country and internation-
ally with the stated goals of intervening in abuse, empowering survivors,
12 See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 557
(2006) (“In the past decade, numerous state and local agencies have adopted policies of
removing children from their mothers’ custody because the children witnessed or could
have witnessed their mothers being abused by husbands, boyfriends, or other inti-
mates.”); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 76
(2002) (“In some states it is considered neglect to permit a child to witness adults fight in
the home. When a mother calls the police to report she has been beaten, she may be
confessing to child neglect.”); cf. Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Cove-
nant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 1540, 1558 (2012) (“Beginning in the late 1960s, social welfare programs were
not premised on assistance, but rather on disciplining, regulating, and punishing benefi-
ciaries, who came to be viewed as the supposed undeserving poor.”).
13 See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLAT-
ERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 2
(2013); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2006) (discussing
how criminal restraining orders produce a “de facto” divorce); AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (Jan. 24,
2015), www.abacollateralconsequences.org [http://perma.cc/5VH8-HAXM] (compiling
an inventory of collateral consequences by jurisdiction); cf. Michael Pinard, Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 511–17 (2010) (identifying the disproportionate impact of collateral
consequences of convictions on communities of color in the United States). See generally
Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 623 (2006) (describing the indirect consequences of federal and state convictions).
14
ORANGE CTY. FAM. JUST. CTR. (CA), www.anaheimfamilyjusticecenter.org [http://
perma.cc/H86C-2KDJ].
15 Infra Part II; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 177–78 (1995) (not-
ing that women’s lives become “public” when a husband is absent).
16 Infra Part II.
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supporting survivors’ autonomy, and being accountable to survivors,17 schol-
ars and advocates need to attentively and scrupulously examine how survi-
vors’ contact with state and community actors in Family Justice Centers
affects survivors’ options and autonomy. The anti-domestic violence move-
ment to date has neglected to recognize the prominence of the criminal jus-
tice system and presence of mandatory reporters within Family Justice
Centers, or to question whether the Centers are operationalizing their goals
and to realize the contradictions and consequences of current practices. The
State has not been a neutral vehicle for reform; upon identifying domestic
violence, the State has exercised protective or punitive mechanisms that dif-
fer from what many survivors desire and that have real consequences on the
survivors’ lives and relationships.18 Although supporting and preserving sur-
vivors’ autonomy was a chief goal of the early battered women’s move-
ment,19 this focus was not present in the development of criminal justice
policy, which is the mainstay of Family Justice Centers.20 While criminal
theory posits that crime is a state issue,21 further reconceptualization of the
operation of Family Justice Centers can enhance the independence, auton-
omy, and dignity of survivors as they seek to eliminate violence and deter-
mine what happens to their families and relationships.
17 Family Justice Centers: A Best Practice Model, FAM. JUST. CTR. ALL., http://www
.familyjusticecenter.org/index.php/the-family-justice-center-approach/best-practice-
model.html [http://perma.cc/L4ED-YJRF].
18 See GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 3–4. R
19 See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 20–28
(2000) (detailing the contemporary development of the battered women’s movement). See
generally LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE (2007)
(describing the history and origin of the battered women’s movement).
20 See Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The Personal Is
Political,” and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255,
1264–71 (2010). See generally Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essen-
tialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that domestic violence law developed primarily around concerns
for safety and batterer accountability rather than survivor autonomy).
21 Historically, domestic violence was condoned by the State and treated as a private
matter, which prevented abuse victims from receiving help and protected abusive partners
from prosecution. See generally Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Pre-
rogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (discussing how the common law right
of chastisement, permitting husbands to use corporal punishment against their wives, per-
sisted beyond its abolishment in American law as a presumption against judicial and
police interference into issues of domestic violence). With recent decades’ increase in
laws and policies against domestic violence, relationship violence is now treated foremost
as a public crime that is a governmental concern, as reflected in mandatory criminal
interventions. See Claire Houston, How Feminist Theory Became (Criminal) Law: Trac-
ing the Path to Mandatory Criminal Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases, 21 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 217, 260–72 (2014). See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and
Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 801, 802–03 (2001) (identifying how domestic violence law reform has focused on
criminal law); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 749–51
(2007) (explaining how criminalization efforts have been at the forefront of domestic
violence reforms).
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The United States’ common law and constitutional traditions protect an
individual’s right to autonomy and right to be free from unwanted govern-
mental intrusions into one’s privacy,22 except in very limited circumstances.23
State involvement that results from a survivor seeking help raises questions
of state power, privilege, and the often unknown cost to survivors of help-
seeking.24 Abuse survivors should not have to move from one situation of
control to another, but state monitoring, intrusion, and control asserts itself
through Family Justice Centers. Low-income survivors may have no choice
but to avail themselves of services at a Family Justice Center, and the need
for shelter, public benefits, and medical care prompts intrusive levels of
questioning as a condition of receiving resources.25 Still, seeking advocacy,
22 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“For also fundamental is the right to
be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions
into one’s privacy.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (“[The
drafters of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.”).
During the past century, the Supreme Court developed a robust doctrine of family
privacy. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law
affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education . . . . These matters . . . ,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citation omitted); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990) (finding bodily integrity as a liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and stating that a competent person has a
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (recognizing “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child”) (emphasis in original); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry or
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by
the State”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing the “private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter”).
23 See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573–74 (N.Y. 1984) (permitting pros-
ecution for marital rape); In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1318–20 (Conn. 1983)
(identifying that state intervention must be necessary to protect a child from real, immedi-
ate physical harm in light of the constitutional right to family integrity).
24 Supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
25 See Ocen, supra note 12, at 1548 (identifying the “robust surveillance and tight R
regulation that are imposed on the beneficiaries of social welfare programs” and describ-
ing how “the racial profiling of Black women’s bodies through social welfare programs
such as Section 8 facilitates contact with law enforcement” and maintains “racial segre-
gation and the burgeoning punitive welfare state”). See generally Khiara M. Bridges,
Towards a Theory of State Visibility: Race, Poverty, and Equal Protection, 19 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 965 (2010) (describing how the Prenatal Care Assistance Program in New
York serves to monitor poor women of color by collecting voluminous amounts of per-
sonal information as a prerequisite for eligibility for welfare benefits, with this informa-
tion sometimes resulting in state intervention in the home, and noting that women who
can afford private health insurance are free from such intrusions); Karen M. Tani, Admin-
istrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the
Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (2015) (identifying how state and local officials histori-
cally enforced different standards on the poor through welfare laws, and citing laws that
made public assistance dependent upon subjective moral judgments).
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legal, and medical services to address domestic violence should not mean
the survivor surrenders his or her constitutional rights to a state apparatus.
A domestic violence center that functions as a state mechanism risks
becoming overly focused on efficiency, professionalism, bureaucratization,
policing, or monitoring functions at the expense of attending to individual
survivors and their wishes and needs.26 Leaders in the Family Justice Center
movement have emphasized that it is an evolving model that should be “ac-
countable on a daily basis to the very women, children, and families that we
are dedicated to serving.”27 In keeping with that vision, this Article seeks to
facilitate ways to offer survivors social, economic, legal, and medical ser-
vices while also preserving their autonomy and protecting them from unin-
tended state intrusion. The laudable goals and intentions of Family Justice
Centers can be salvaged while disarming the State from using survivors’ in-
formation in ways contrary to survivors’ wishes and well-being.
Part I describes the historical development and core features of the
Family Justice Center model, a rapidly proliferating model that co-locates
governmental and community services for domestic violence survivors.
Part II identifies how, with multiple agencies housed under one roof, an
individual weaving his or her way through a Family Justice Center may not
be aware of the consequences of providing information to the various state
and community actors. This part details the common agencies that are part of
Family Justice Centers and potential consequences of revealing information
to them. Information is an important route through which the State exercises
its protective powers, as service providers operate to channel information to
the State. This section particularly explores the potential harm to and in-
creased state monitoring of low-income survivors and women and families
of color, especially given troubling historic and continuing relationships be-
tween legal institutions and persons of color in poverty. Part II also discusses
the commonality with which helping actors substitute their judgment for that
of abuse survivors, presuming abused individuals have diminished capacity
to act on their own behalf and to protect their children.
Part III explores ways to enhance survivors’ autonomy and decision
making to further the Centers’ goals of being survivor-centered and account-
able to the victims they serve. Part III.A recommends that the Centers cease
advertising themselves as “confidential,” as this false claim materially mis-
represents the reporting duties and interests of the actors housed in the Cen-
ters. Building on the critique of mandatory reporting laws in Part II, Part
III.B proposes amendments to many of the current requirements so that
safety, health, and community professionals can provide helping services
without necessarily invoking the criminal or child welfare systems. This sec-
26 Cf. Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV.
621, 646 (2005) (discussing how increased bureaucratization and professionalism alter
conceptions of due process protections in criminal proceedings).
27 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 120; see also id. at 82. R
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tion questions the appropriateness of mandatory reporting occurring when an
abused individual is seeking assistance from a helping service.
Currently, most domestic abuse survivors are unrepresented and must
navigate law enforcement encounters, Family Justice Centers, and court pro-
ceedings on their own.28 In seeking to make Family Justice Centers more
survivor-centered and driven, rather than an additional locus of control and
state power, Part III.C suggests that a survivor coming to a Family Justice
Center be given an Attorney Navigator—a civil attorney who would provide
individualized advice and counseling to help the survivor navigate the Fam-
ily Justice Center. This part explores the utilization of informed consent or a
Miranda-type warning to achieve informed decision-making and promote
the survivor’s autonomy and safety.
This Article concludes by recommending that in the absence of ade-
quate warnings or counsel to the victim about the consequences of providing
information, the State should be prohibited from using information obtained
against the victim or his or her alleged perpetrator.
I. THE FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER MODEL
The Family Justice Center model developed to counter the government’s
historic failure to address domestic violence and in response to advocates’
calls for a coordinated community response to domestic violence.29 The Cen-
ters subscribe to a common mission and include core elements, but are run
independently and differ based on the variety of community organizations
represented. This section describes the historical context in which Family
Justice Centers developed, the model’s national expansion and global
proliferation, and common features of the model.
A. Historical Context
Historically, the State failed to adequately address the existence of do-
mestic violence. Examples of laws condoning family violence include the
28 See JANE C. MURPHY & ROBERT RUBINSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 161–62 (2009) (reporting that approximately eighty percent of family law liti-
gants that technically qualify as indigent and thus eligible for free legal assistance are
unable to obtain representation); Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for
Appointed Counsel in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
557, 567 (2006) (reporting that, in one Illinois jurisdiction, neither party was represented
in 83.4% of civil protection cases); Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law: An
Impassioned Exploration for Family Peace, 33 FAM. L.Q. 719, 722 (1999) (noting the
“crisis in the dearth of legal representation available for battered women”); Margo Lin-
dauer, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Why Multi-Court-Involved Battered
Mothers Just Can’t Win, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 797, 808 (2012) (identify-
ing that the number of pro se litigants in family law cases is annually increasing).
29 See Deseriee Kennedy, From Collaboration to Consolidation: Developing a More
Expansive Model for Responding to Family Violence, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1,
21–24 (2013).
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husband’s right of chastisement,30 the so-called “rule of thumb,”31 inter-
spousal tort immunity,32 and the marital rape exception,33 which persists for-
mally and informally today. Police were historically reluctant to intervene in
domestic violence incidents and routinely failed to respond to battered wo-
men’s calls for help.34
During the 1970s, the feminist movement and battered women’s move-
ment engaged in consciousness raising about the widespread occurrence and
devastating consequences of domestic abuse, and the shelter movement de-
30 See, e.g., State v. Edens, 95 N.C. 693, 696 (1886) (holding that a man could sub-
ject his wife to “assault and battery” if he inflicted no permanent injury upon her); State
v. Black, 60 N.C. 262, 263 (1864) (holding that it was the husband’s duty to make the
wife “behave herself” and to thrash her, if necessary to that end); State v. Hussey, 44
N.C. 123, 127 (1852) (holding that a wife could not testify against her husband if she
sustained only non-permanent injuries from the beatings); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *444 (stating that the husband had the “power of restraining [the wife],
by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his
apprentices or children”). See generally Siegel, supra note 21 (discussing the history of R
the right of chastisement in American common law).
31 See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 157–58 (1824) (holding that a husband
could not be subject to assault and battery charges, under the common law right of chas-
tisement, so long as he did not beat his wife with a whip, rod, or other instrument thicker
than his thumb).
32 See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877) (holding the husband immune
from tort liability for assaulting his wife and stating “[t]he private matters of the whole
period of married existence might be exposed by suits,” which would “add a new method
by which estates could be plundered”); Camille Carey, Domestic Violence Torts: Right-
ing a Civil Wrong, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 695, 725 (2014) (describing how most states
maintained spousal immunity for tort claims through the twentieth century and how
courts have persisted in enforcing the doctrine, even though legally abrogated).
33 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2000) (describing how most states preserve the marital rape
exemption in some form); see also Jaye Sitton, Old Wine in New Bottles: The “Marital”
Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261, 277–78 (1993) (explaining that instead of abolish-
ing the traditional marital rape exemption in its entirety, many state legislatures adopted
some type of allowance, such as imposing a more lenient punishment for assaulting one’s
wife as opposed to another woman). See generally Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immu-
nity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by
Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465 (2003) (explaining the trajectory and development of
the marital rape exception in state law).
34 See Raymond I. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967
WIS. L. REV. 914, 917–22 (1967); see also Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Bat-
tered Women, 5 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 7, 9–10 (1979).
Statutory barriers to police response included the requirement in many states that po-
lice witness the assault or battery before making a warrantless arrest. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 836 (West 2013). Police discretion resulted in very few arrests, and rates
of prosecution were even lower. Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Wo-
men: A New Direction for Policy and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. IN-
TERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 480–81 (2005). Based on the historic inaction, in two
companion class action cases filed in 1976 by battered women against police depart-
ments, plaintiffs argued for intimate partner violence to be treated with the same serious-
ness as stranger violence and to similarly be recognized as a crime, thereby entitling
abuse victims to the same legal protections as other crime victims, including the abuse
perpetrator’s arrest and prosecution. See Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977).
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veloped.35 In addition to providing emergency housing to abuse survivors
and their children, shelters commonly offered food, clothing, and access to
services such as financial literacy and credit repair, and helped with eco-
nomic security through job training and placement.36
Even as advocates sought to redefine domestic violence as a crime,
many were skeptical of government remedies, particularly given the historic
tension between governmental and community-based responses and ac-
knowledging the criminal justice system’s role in legitimizing different
forms of oppression.37 Some advocates also voiced concern about partnering
with and supporting “an oppressive criminal justice system given their own
anti-oppression agenda.”38 One feminist wrote, “Because we know the hor-
ror and frustration of oppression and exploitation, we must decide if the only
way of alleviating our own is to cooperate with the criminal justice system,
to shift this burden of oppression onto other shoulders.”39
Although hesitant, advocates turned to the justice system to develop
legal interventions in abuse, and states created civil and criminal justice re-
sponses to domestic violence from the 1970s to the 1990s. Civil protection
order laws were designed as a survivor-centered injunctive remedy with
criminal enforcement capabilities, and included relief such as “no contact”
provisions, child custody and visitation awards, property possession, and
batterer treatment.40 Many jurisdictions formed specialized domestic vio-
lence courts.41 Through the heightened criminalization of domestic violence
over the past several decades, mandatory arrest and prosecution policies pro-
35 Goodman & Epstein, supra note 34, at 480. R
36 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 80. R
37
SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 182–84 (explaining feminist reluctance to engage R
with the State); Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 109 (“Historically, there has been tension R
between those working on behalf of domestic violence victims within the government
and those working in the social service setting.”); see also Sue Osthoff, But, Gertrude, I
Beg to Differ, a Hit Is Not a Hit Is Not a Hit: When Battered Women Are Arrested for
Assaulting Their Partners, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1521, 1533 (2002) (“Since wo-
men began to organize to end violence against women back in the 1970s, women of color
have warned White advocates about the dangers and pitfalls, especially for communities
of color, of relying so heavily on the criminal legal system as the primary method of
assisting victims of violence.”). See generally BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME:
THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK WOMEN (1996) (illustrating how Afri-
can American women in low-income communities are constrained by competing forces
of unmet need and limited resources).
38 Houston, supra note 21, at 219. R
39 Linda Kupis, More Power for the State, FEMINIST ALL. AGAINST RAPE NEWSLET-
TER (Sept./Oct. 1974), http://www.faar-aegis.org/sepoct_74/kupis_sepoct74.html [http://
perma.cc/D9FU-MZS7].
40 See Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to
Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 320–21 (2011).
41 See Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg) (authorizing the Attorney Gen-
eral to make $120 million in grants to states from 1996 to 1998 to encourage states to
treat domestic violence as a “serious violation of the criminal law” by implementing
mandatory arrest programs, educating judges and police on how to handle domestic vio-
lence cases, and creating specialized units for responding to domestic violence).
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liferated.42 In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) as part of the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act.43 VAWA
created federal remedies for abuse and devoted federal funding to anti-abuse
programming,44 with the bulk of funding dedicated to criminal justice
responses.45
As services became available, survivors were then in the position of
possibly having to navigate multiple agencies and options to seek services
and to tell their stories many times, often while facing danger and experienc-
ing the effects of abuse. Domestic violence experts thus called for the crea-
tion of coordinated community responses to better coordinate justice systems
and community agency responses.46 The dominant outgrowth has been the
recent national movement to create Family Justice Centers, which co-locate
the services of multiple state and community organizations.47 The Centers’
concept originated in San Diego with three prosecutors who proposed a “one
stop shop” domestic violence service center, which resulted in the first Fam-
ily Justice Center opening in 2002.48
B. Proliferation of the Centers
The proliferation of Family Justice Centers began in 2004 when Presi-
dent Bush’s Family Justice Center Initiative awarded over $20 million to
communities to create new Centers.49 Nationwide, there are now over eighty
42 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.2901 (2014) (declaring that state attorneys “shall adopt
a pro-prosecution policy for acts of domestic violence” and providing that the decision to
prosecute “shall be determined by these specialized prosecutors over the objection of the
victim, if necessary”).
43 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
44 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First
Century: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 355 (2008) (describing
how Congress’s initial passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994 and
the legislation’s subsequent reauthorization has provided a wide range of federal funding
for programs assisting battered women).
45 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (devoting $800 million to Services for Training Officers
and Prosecutors (STOP) grants to encourage “widespread apprehension, prosecution, and
adjudication of persons committing violent criminal acts against women,” and further
allocating $120 million to states to implement “mandatory arrest or pro-arrest programs
and policies in police departments”).
46 See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethink-
ing the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3,
28–32 (1999).
47 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 88–90 (identifying President George W. Bush’s $20 R
million Family Justice Center Initiative as the launching point for the spread of FJCs).
48 Id. at 83–84 (identifying the original partnering agencies as the San Diego City
Attorney’s Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Unit, the San Diego Police Department,
Child Protective Services, Children’s Hospital, the YWCA, and a local non-profit organi-
zation called the Center for Community Solutions).
49 Id. at 88–90.
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Family Justice Centers in operation, with many more in planning stages.50
The model is also being adopted and replicated internationally: there are
already at least ten Centers in other countries including Canada, Sweden,
England, Mexico, and Jordan, and additional Centers are being developed in
the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and Europe.51 Globally, over one
hundred Centers are in development.52 Although the model is rapidly prolif-
erating, very little research has been conducted about the Centers.53
C. Core Features
The core concept behind Family Justice Centers is the co-location of
staff members from multiple agencies under one roof.54 Common partners in
these “one-stop shop[s] for domestic violence victims”55 include police of-
ficers, prosecutors, civil legal service providers, and community-based advo-
cates. The vision behind the Centers is to provide one place where victims
can go to talk to an advocate to plan for their safety, interview with a police
officer, meet with a prosecutor, receive medical assistance, utilize forensic
evidence collection capabilities, access social services, receive employment
and career counseling, and gain information on shelter and other safety ser-
vices.56 From the perspective of law enforcement, police and prosecutors are
able to collect evidence and coordinate the investigation and prosecution of




53 See Joel H. Garner & Christopher D. Maxwell, Coordinated Community Responses
to Intimate Partner Violence in the 20th and 21st Centuries, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 525, 530–31 (2008) (finding that the 2003 President’s Family Justice Center Initia-
tive is not being evaluated for its effect on repeat offending); Christine E. Murray et al., A
Community Considers a Family Justice Center: Perspectives of Stakeholders During the
Early Phases of Development, 6 J. AGGRESSION, CONFLICT & PEACE RES. 116, 116
(2014) (identifying the “minimal research” that exists that examines the planning stages
and process for creating a Family Justice Center). See generally Meg Townsend et al.,
Evaluability Assessment of the President’s Family Justice Center Initiative, NAT’L CRIM.
JUST. REFERENCE SERV. (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212278.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P7SZ-7MPV] (providing a prototype evaluation design by which to as-
sess Family Justice Centers in the future).
54
OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT’S
FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER INITIATIVE BEST PRACTICES 1 (2007) http://www.justice.gov/
archive/ovw/docs/family_justice_center_overview_12_07.pdf [http://perma.cc/JY25-
4YTV] (quoting Mary Beth Buchanan, former Acting Director of the Office of Violence
Against Women, saying “The family justice center is, at its core, a concept that increases
community capacity while also providing diverse, culturally competent services to vic-
tims and their children from a single location.”).
55 Schneider, supra note 44, at 355 (identifying the advent of “one-stop shopping” R
for abuse victims at Family Justice Centers); see also Dioni L. Wise, 1-Stop Center De-
signed to Help Victims, NEWS & REC., Jan. 15, 2012, at B1, B3.
56 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 91–92. R
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crimes.57 Through the co-location of multi-disciplinary services, abuse survi-
vors can become aware of and access a multitude of services at one location,
and agencies are able to coordinate services. Co-location also allows agen-
cies to share overhead expenses, which can increase the sustainability of
some community organizations, although some communities have found the
cultural and social justice aspects of their missions to be stifled by Family
Justice Centers’ focus on the criminal justice system.58 Abused individuals
and their children often have urgent medical, legal, housing, and safety
needs, and confront multiple oppressions, such as poverty, language barriers,
and discrimination.59 Co-location can allow the Centers to respond to these
co-occurring issues and barriers; however, such issues of intersectionality
and oppression can also make a person more vulnerable to state monitoring
and intrusion, as explored in Part II.
Connected to the co-location design, another stated feature of Centers is
that they utilize case management and information sharing systems with cli-
ent consent.60 While Centers advance the argument that information sharing
can relieve survivors of the emotional strain and time required when re-
telling events to multiple actors, functionally, survivors often retell their sto-
ries throughout the Centers because the different actors they encounter have
different perspectives and motives and seek differing forms of information.
57 See id. at 107 (“Prosecutors sitting across the hall from detectives could see first
hand the work being done and soon, detectives and prosecutors started talking to each
other about the cases and working on them together.”).
58 See Gretchen Arnold, The Impact of Social Ties on Coalition Strength and Effec-
tiveness: The Case of the Battered Women’s Movement in St. Louis, 10 SOC. MOVEMENT
STUD. 131, 143–44 (2011) (finding that the St. Louis Family Justice Center closed in part
because of the failure of government bureaucracies to work effectively with social move-
ment organizations).
59 See Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic
Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1215 n.219 (2009)
(explaining that domestic violence responses must comprehensively respond to the multi-
ple intersections survivors face, such as resource deprivation and language); see also
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vio-
lence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (explaining that
women’s experiences of violence are often shaped by multiple dimensions of their identi-
ties, including race and class); Nancy K. D. Lemon, Access to Justice: Can Domestic
Violence Courts Better Address the Needs of Non-English Speaking Victims of Domestic
Violence?, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 38, 38 (2006) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of domestic violence courts providing free professional interpreters); Shelby A.D.
Moore, Understanding the Connection Between Domestic Violence, Crime, and Poverty:
How Welfare Reform May Keep Battered Women from Leaving Abusive Relationships, 12
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 451, 456 (2003) (describing the connections between the abuse that
women suffer and the crimes they commit and examining the economic barriers to escap-
ing abuse, including the “systemic impediments” created through welfare reform);
Deborah A. Morgan, Access Denied: Barriers to Remedies Under the Violence Against
Women Act for Limited English Proficient Battered Immigrant Women, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 485, 509 (2005) (arguing that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ adminis-
tration of the Violence Against Women Act violates the due process rights of immigrant
survivors of abuse).
60 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 91. R
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Furthermore, the implications of sharing information across agencies should
also be revealed.
In addition to the co-location of agencies, core elements of Family Jus-
tice Centers include pro-arrest or mandatory arrest policies and an emphasis
on the importance of prosecution.61 The Centers’ architects were prosecutors,
and offender accountability is a central value of the Centers, as is criminal
justice presence. These sentiments are reflected in the statement of one origi-
nator of the Center design: “[B]ecause of the criminal nature of most vio-
lence and abuse, intervention efforts must continue to see the importance of
police officers and prosecutors in the overall approach to these centers.”62
Given the centrality of the criminal justice system to the creation and
existence of Family Justice Centers, interest group capture by police or pros-
ecutors who are motivated to push cases into the criminal justice system
should be guarded against through systemic checks on power to ensure that
criminal justice interests do not drive and overwhelm the anti-violence and
empowerment missions of the Centers.63 The superior organizational capaci-
ties of law enforcement, steady funding for criminalization, and information
asymmetry between abuse victims and agents at Family Justice Centers can
be contrasted with many survivors’ limited resources and inability to collec-
tively mobilize. In the context of Family Justice Centers, overrepresentation
of criminal justice interests can stifle survivors’ needs and interests and cre-
ate unexpected consequences for abuse victims, as discussed in Part II. In-
formation provision and internal review mechanisms and monitoring could
assist with prioritizing survivors’ needs in a location intended to serve
abused individuals.64
61
OFFICE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 54, at 2. R
62 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 118; see also Lisa Growette Bostaph, Nampa Family R
Justice Center 2010 Outcome Evaluation 22, FAM. JUST. CTR. (2010), http://www.family
justicecenter.org/component/jdownloads/send/42-evaluation-outcomes/255-evaluation-a-
outcomes-nampa-fjc-2010-outcome-evaluation-bostaph-01-10.html [http://perma.cc/
2RBX-FRJE] (finding that the work done by the Nampa Family Justice Center may have
led to significant increases in reporting, referral, prosecution, and sentencing of domestic
violence cases).
63 Cf. Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing
challenges related to imbalance in organizational capacities, especially “in the face of
stiff resistance from well-funded groups with a potent interest in perpetuating the status
quo”); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 40 (2010) (identifying empirical research that shows that “a
group composed solely of ideologically like-minded people tends toward extreme deci-
sion making”).
64 See Rachel E. Barkow, Explaining and Curbing Capture 18 N.C. BANKING INST.
17, 24 (2013) (discussing the solution to agency capture of having a consumer advocate
or internal watchdog monitor an agency, particularly if the agency is inclined to favor a
particular industry); Robert N. Mayer et al., Consumer Representation and Local Tele-
phone Rates, 23 J. CONSUMER AFF. 267, 279–80 (1989) (studying the role of consumer
advocates in agency policy and finding that advocates who are independent entities in the
bureaucracy produce the most consumer-friendly outcomes).
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Most Family Justice Centers advertise that they provide confidential
services.65 To provide one example, the Orange County Family Justice
Center publicizes itself as a “safe, confidential, and friendly place.”66 This
language, however, is used in imprecise and potentially detrimental ways.
The services are “confidential” in that the communications will not typically
be revealed to the abusive partner, although there are exceptions to this gen-
eral rule.67 However, the label of “confidential” conceals that most service
providers are mandatory reporters of child abuse—including violence exper-
ienced by teenagers—and elder abuse, and some professionals are mandated
to report domestic violence.68 Breaking from the norm of calling the Center
“confidential,” the Family Justice Center Sonoma County more accurately
advises:
As members of the public service community, most of the people
you will meet at the Family Justice Center Sonoma County are
Mandated Reporters. This means that if you tell us about sus-
pected or known abuse to a child, elder, or depend[e]nt adult we
will make a report to the appropriate agency (Child Protective Ser-
vices, Adult Protective Services, etc.). Staff must also make a re-
port if a client expresses a desire to commit an act which would
hurt him/herself (suicide) or another person (homicide).69
Family Justice Centers serve a vulnerable population without charging a
fee, yet there is the cost of providing personal information, especially as the
collection of certain information can be used against victims and lead to
negative consequences and sustained state intervention in the home. The in-
formation necessary to prove one is an abuse survivor deserving of services
can be compared to requirements for receiving government benefits, such as
applicants for social welfare programs being required to submit to finger-
printing, photographing, DNA testing, and drug testing, along with the infor-
mation they provide being given to law enforcement to pursue criminal
prosecutions.70 Furthermore, participation in social welfare programs re-
65 See supra note 8 and Appendix A. R
66
ORANGE CTY. FAM. JUST. CTR., http://www.anaheimfamilyjusticecenter.org/in-
dex.php [http://perma.cc/BU5Q-SR6N].
67 See generally Jeffrey R. Baker, Necessary Third Parties: Multidisciplinary Collab-
oration and Inadequate Professional Privileges in Domestic Violence Practice, 21
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 283 (2011) (discussing how the current applications of profes-
sional privilege in multidisciplinary responses to domestic violence do not adequately
protect survivors’ confidential information and may leave them vulnerable to further
abuse).
68 Infra Part II.
69 What is Mandatory Reporting?, FAM. JUST. CTR. SONOMA CTY., http://www.fjcsc
.org/faq.html#Reporting [http://perma.cc/A559-3E4N].
70 Ocen, supra note 12, at 1565. Ocen also concludes that the “regulation of subsidy R
programs and those who rely on them, therefore, operates as pretext for disciplining the
private and intimate lives of Black women and regulating the physical spaces they oc-
cupy.” Id. at 1568.
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quires the relinquishment of rights, including the right to privacy and the
right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.71 The implications
of mandatory reporting at Family Justice Centers are explored in the next
section.
II. COLLATERAL AND UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES
Rachel goes to the nearest hospital after being raped. Rather than re-
ceiving medical treatment there, she is transferred to the local Family Jus-
tice Center for state actors to perform evidence collection. As a rape victim
in a jurisdiction with a Family Justice Center, her medical care is linked to a
prosecutorial mission.
The co-location of agencies at Family Justice Centers enables abuse sur-
vivors to access a multitude of services in one location;72 however, the Cen-
ters contain numerous mandatory reporters and often function as state
apparatuses, which has significant implications for survivors and their fami-
lies. An individual weaving his or her way through a Family Justice Center
may not be aware of the consequences of providing information to the vari-
ous state and community actors, including the likelihood of unintended crim-
inal justice or Child Protective Services involvement. Once in the regulatory
state of the social welfare, criminal justice, or child welfare systems, individ-
uals are disproportionately catalogued, monitored, and intruded upon, result-
ing in further impact on survivors and their families.73
While the Centers have many positive intentions and effects, they can
also be viewed in the context of the historical criminal, child welfare, and
social service control of poor communities of color.74 Subordination and ex-
periences of violence are linked by race, class, and gender, as poor Ameri-
71 Id. at 1567; see also Sanchez v. Cty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding that public benefits recipients have no reasonable expectation of privacy
given their reliance on government assistance). See generally Kaaryn Gustafson, The
Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009) (tracing the
criminalization of welfare).
72 See CASEY GWINN & GAEL STRACK, HOPE FOR HURTING FAMILIES: CREATING
FAMILY JUSTICE CENTERS ACROSS AMERICA 46–47 (2006).
73 Michele E. Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
1389, 1389–90 (2012) (identifying how the poor “endure a barrage of information-collec-
tion practices that are far more invasive and degrading than those experienced by their
wealthier neighbors,” such as home searches upon applying for public benefits, interro-
gations by unannounced investigators, and verification through neighbors); Michele E.
Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 2 (2009) (describing the
“routinized surveillance of poor women” carried out as conditions of receiving public
benefits, with intrusions including fingerprinting, drug tests, restrictions on reproductive
choices, and unscheduled home inspections); Ocen, supra note 12, at 1564 (“Increas- R
ingly, for black women the welfare system has become a part of a continuum of punish-
ment that begins with a presumption of criminality and extends through surveillance and
incarceration.”).
74 See Wendy Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support,
25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 319–20 (2014); Sari Horwitz, FBI Director Acknowledges
“Hard Truths” About Racial Bias in Policing, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2015, at A1. See
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cans are disproportionately women of color,75 and increased poverty
correlates with greater levels of domestic violence.76 Survivors experiencing
multiple issues of intersectionality or oppression related to their race, cul-
ture, sexual orientation, gender identity, income, religion, immigration sta-
tus, language ability, physical or mental abilities, or other aspects of their
identity77 can find themselves under heightened levels of scrutiny, state mon-
itoring, and regulation once entering the Center.78 Centers can become sites
at which survivors’ “autonomy is denied and their privacy rights and expec-
tations are presumed to be nonexistent or negligible.”79
Family Justice Centers can be compared to other collaborative systems
that put state actors in the role of therapeutic agents, but are often highly
punitive to those the systems are designed to serve. For example, defendants
who submit to drug court and who fail to abide by the prescribed treatment
plan are generally punished more harshly than those who do not attempt this
diversion and treatment.80 In these various collaborative models, the same
actors who offer help can also police those seeking assistance.81
The following sections detail the common actors and agencies that are
part of Family Justice Centers and some of the potential consequences of
revealing information to them. Whether or not a particular Center formally
identifies as a government agency, state influence is present throughout all
generally ROBERTS, supra note 12 (discussing the child welfare system’s disruptive, con- R
trolling influence on Black families).
75 See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 81, 88 (2d ed. 2006).
76 Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 367, 367 (2003) (“[H]ousehold income does predict the probability of family
violence: the lower the household income, the higher the rates of violence.”).
77 See Crenshaw, supra note 59, at 1241–42. R
78 For a discussion of implicit bias and unconscious discrimination, see Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 945, 961–62 (2006); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Pro-
tection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 339–344 (1987);
Ian Ayres, When Whites Get a Free Pass: Research Shows White Privilege Is Real, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2015, at A23.
79 Khiara M. Bridges, Poor Women and the Protective State, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1619,
1620 (2012) (discussing the New York State Prenatal Care Assistance Program’s ques-
tioning that gives the government access to intimate details of poor women’s lives).
80 See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 786
(2008) (explaining how drug courts “provide the worst results to their target popula-
tions,” with an “inversion of intended effect,” especially for those who suffer from ac-
tual, sustained drug dependence); id. at 834 (further identifying how drug courts dole out
“far longer sentences for the very defendants who historically have faced the greatest
rates and lengths of imprisonment under the traditional war on drugs, and who are al-
ready some of the least well off in society”); Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch
Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2071 (2002) (“Drug courts not
only do not reduce recidivism or relapse, they have the unintended consequence of dra-
matically increasing the number of drug defendants sent to prison.”).
81 See Hoffman, supra note 80, at 2088 (“In its most virulent drug court form it R
requires us to send people to prison not because they violated the law (since the real
engine of drug courts is the unstated belief that possession should not be a crime), but
rather because they resisted our enlightened treatment efforts.”).
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Centers,82 meaning survivors are always at risk of facing the consequences
of state intervention, including ongoing surveillance, supervision, regulation,
and punishment.83 The discussion that follows about the consequences of
providing information to various helping agents is applicable to the individ-
ual actors outside or inside a Family Justice Center complex, but when the
agencies are housed together, the problems compound and increase in
complexity.
A. Substituted Judgment
Even beyond mandatory reporting obligations, state agents and profes-
sionals often substitute their judgment for that of abuse survivors.84 Al-
though Family Justice Centers hold survivor empowerment and autonomy as
core values,85 those in helping roles may disregard survivors’ wishes out of
protectionism or paternalism, overemphasizing a “victim” status at the ex-
pense of treating the survivor as an equal citizen.86 Leigh Goodmark notes:
“Once a woman has experienced domestic violence, she somehow becomes
incapable of rationality—with rational defined as making the choice that
system actors believe she should make.”87
Alongside the battered women’s movement of the 1970s, theorizing
about domestic violence occurred, and psychologist Lenore Walker devel-
oped the construct of Battered Women’s Syndrome, which includes the cycle
of violence and concept of learned helplessness.88 Walker posited that
82 See Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 109. R
83 This may be particularly true in this era of increasing governmental surveillance
and mandated reporting. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (2015). See generally CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (2007) (tracing the modern rise in government surveillance at the expense
of Fourth Amendment rights, and suggesting a new framework in which to balance the
need for intelligence gathering with respect for citizens’ privacy); John Napier Tye, Opin-
ion, Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule that Lets the NSA Spy on Americans,
WASH. POST, July 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-or-
der-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b9
3-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html [http://perma.cc/7YLT-WD84] (arguing that Ex-
ecutive Order 12333, permitting the collection of communications by U.S. persons, sig-
nificantly abridged the protections of the Fourth Amendment).
84 See generally Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engag-
ing the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191 (2008)
(exploring how judges often override victims’ requests to vacate or dissolve protection
orders, thereby substituting their own judgment and denying the victim’s agency).




ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 200 (2013).
87 Leigh Goodmark, Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: An Anti-Essen-
tialist Proposal, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 53 (2009).
88 See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter
WALKER I] (conceptualizing the battered woman as a victim and providing an overview
of the cyclical and psychological elements of abuse); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BAT-
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through the batterer’s control and repeated abuse, the victim comes to be-
lieve she is unable to control or predict what will happen to her, experiences
a “psychological paralysis,” and becomes submissive and helpless.89
Walker’s theories have now been critiqued on multiple grounds, including
the methodological and interpretive flaws90 and ways in which abused indi-
viduals are portrayed as passive and helpless victims with diminished
agency.91 More recent research contradicts Walker’s portrayal, instead estab-
lishing that people who experience domestic violence are typically active
survivors who are vigorously engaged in help-seeking behaviors and are
highly motivated to terminate the abuse.92
Despite the re-conceptualization of abused individuals as survivors, the
public, medical community, and legal systems hold fast to a stereotypical
image of abused women as passive, dependent, and helpless.93 The criminal
justice policies of mandatory arrest and prosecution that took root in the
1990s grew from the early theorizing and exclude victim input, instead sup-
planting the survivor’s voice with the State’s decision.94 Civil judges simi-
TERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER II] (expanding on Walker’s ear-
lier work with research and data drawn from her tenure at the Battered Women Research
Center at Colorado Women’s College).
89
WALKER I, supra note 88, at 43, 47. R
90 See generally David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome
in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (1997) (arguing that Battered Women’s Syn-
drome is not good science); David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and
Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986) (contending that
use of Battered Women’s Syndrome as evidence to support self-defense claims is troub-
ling); Marilyn McMahon, Battered Women and Bad Science: The Limited Validity and
Utility of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 6 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 23 (1999) (iden-
tifying deficiencies in Lenore Walker’s conclusions regarding Battered Women’s
Syndrome).
91 See Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. L.J.
483, 506–09 (2013); see also Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Prob-
lem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 23 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 38
(1989) (explaining how use of Battered Women’s Syndrome leads juries to characterize
abuse victims “as incompetent rather than as reasonable . . . [and to label them] unrea-
sonable, incompetent, suffering from psychological impairment or just plain crazy.”). See
generally Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993) (offering
an expert witness’s perspective on Battered Women’s Syndrome).
92 See EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 17–18, 20–22, 93 (1988); Jes-
sica R. Goodkind et al., A Contextual Analysis of Battered Women’s Safety Planning, 10
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 514, 515 (2004) (discussing a “variety of strategies . . . to
help each woman decide for herself what might or might not reduce her future risk of
abuse”).
People respond to trauma differently. While current research focuses on abused indi-
viduals as being active survivors who go to great lengths to survive relationship violence,
it is simultaneously recognized that there can be many psychological effects of experienc-
ing abuse, including high rates of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. See gen-
erally JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1997) (describing the psychological
harm many abuse survivors experience).
93 See GOODMARK, supra note 2, at 54. R
94 See Kohn, supra note 84, at 193–94; see also Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose, R
109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1865 (1996) (“Pro-prosecution advocates argue that aggressive
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larly often disregard victims’ requests, believing victims cannot think
rationally or act in their children’s best interests due to the abuse they have
endured or the abuser’s continued control over the victim.95 Even today,
many advocates persist in treating individuals who have experienced abuse
as victims who lack the capacity to make good decisions for themselves and
their children. Abuse survivors who flee without their children are demon-
ized, and women who stay in abusive relationships are critiqued and blamed,
particularly when they have children. The service provider may have a pre-
selected answer for solving the abuse, but this may run contrary to the survi-
vor’s vision.
The power imbalance between those who provide services to abused
individuals at Family Justice Centers and other locations and the survivors
who seek services means the service provider is in the position of determin-
ing whether the survivor fits the mold of a victim deserving of services and
whether the provider obtains information from the survivor that the provider
reports to the State.96 Intake counselors who serve as gatekeepers at Family
Justice Centers may have a conception of who is “deserving” of services,
overlooking the needs of survivors with substance abuse, mental health is-
sues, or criminal histories.97 They may otherwise judge a survivor’s actions
and decisions, especially if the survivor has not been resolute in leaving the
abusive partner,98 and may report the survivor to the State. Front desk staff
may have a hetero-normative view of domestic violence and fail to serve
lesbian and gay survivors, especially male victims or individuals who report
being abused by a “roommate.”99 The focus on intimate partner violence
policies take the burden off the victim by removing her as the ‘plaintiff.’ They contend
that the batterer has less incentive to try to control or intimidate his victim once he real-
izes that she no longer controls the process.”).
95 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998)
(“[W]here the victim has continual fear of the defendant, the defendant’s perceived con-
trol over the victim may attenuate the victim’s ability to act in the best interests of the
children. Moreover, the fear might attenuate the ability of the victim to act in his or her
own best interests.”).
96 See Emi Koyama, Disloyal to Feminism: Abuse of Survivors Within the Domestic
Violence Shelter System, COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 208, 209–10
(2006) (recounting the mold into which victims must fit to receive services and the many
rules women in shelters must abide by).
97 See Michele Bograd, Strengthening Domestic Violence Theories: Intersections of
Race, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Gender, 25 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 275, 280
(1999). See generally Debra Kaysen et al., Domestic Violence and Alcohol Use: Trauma-
related Symptoms and Motives for Drinking, 32 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 1272 (2007) (find-
ing increased use of alcohol among battered women with chronic trauma exposure, and
discussing the commonality of drinking to cope with abuse).
98 See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domes-
tic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008) (arguing that the law has traditionally provided relief only to
those domestic violence victims who have terminated the abusive relationship).
99 See Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere
While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325, 349–350
(1999).
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might also preclude intra-family abuse survivors, such as a parent being
abused by his or her teenager, from receiving help.
The “victim” designation is another point at which Center actors exer-
cise judgment. Family Justice Centers specify that they are designed to aid
domestic violence “victims” and are resolute in their intention to serve vic-
tims, not perpetrators of abuse. The President’s Family Justice Center Initia-
tive Best Practices resource identifies that a Family Justice Center is a
“Victim-Centered Facility where Offenders are Prohibited.”100 Center ad-
ministrators frequently review the parties’ court records and criminal histo-
ries before admitting someone to the Center,101 but relying on this
information can fail to reveal who is truly in need of protection. The seem-
ingly simple resolve to serve “victims” masks the potential complexity of
differentiating perpetrators from abuse victims who are charged with crimes,
including assault. This oversimplified mandate raises concerns that “battered
women who are also defendants may be arrested, turned away and/or not
served at Family Justice Centers.”102 In some situations, it may be difficult to
determine who is the victim, as it is not uncommon for abuse survivors to be
“accused of crimes relating directly or indirectly” to the abuse they en-
dured.103 It can become a race to the Center, with an abusive partner making
misrepresentations to receive services first and prevent the other party from
accessing help.104
Regarding service providers reporting information that prompts state
involvement, comparable situations occur in other medical and legal settings
in which patients or clients seek help and disclose information.105 For exam-
100
OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 54, at 4; see also Gwinn et al., R
supra note 4, at 89–90. R




102 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 118; see also Osthoff, supra note 37, at 1527 (dis- R
cussing how many community-based domestic violence advocacy programs refuse to as-
sist battered women charged with crimes because they say that they do not work with
“perpetrators”).
103 Moore, supra note 59, at 457. R
104 See Susan L. Miller, The Paradox of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence:
Criminal Justice Professionals and Service Providers Respond, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1339, 1355–56 (2001) (noting how some male batterers use knowledge of the
criminal justice system to falsely accuse their female partners of domestic violence before
the female partners can do so themselves, giving batterers another way to exert power
and control).
105 Attorneys and psychiatrists also have state-created duties or options of disclosure.
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 2015) (recognizing that although attor-
ney-client communications are generally considered privileged and confidential, attor-
neys have an option to disclose client confidences to prevent harm to another); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 56.10(c)(19) (West 2015) (allowing that a psychotherapist may report to protect
or warn a third party if the therapist actually believes or predicts that the patient poses a
serious risk of inflicting serious bodily injury upon a reasonably identifiable victim);
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (holding that if a
therapist determines or reasonably should have determined “that a patient poses a serious
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ple, pregnant women receiving prenatal care encounter doctors with report-
ing abilities or obligations,106 and conflicts between maternal autonomy and
doctors’ orders occur in the context of the private relationship of doctors and
patients.107 Doctors often “project their own estimations of the optimal
course of action onto their pregnant patients,”108 increasingly demanding that
pregnant women have Cesarean sections or risk being reported to child wel-
fare authorities,109 and seeking legal orders to regulate, monitor, or incarcer-
ate pregnant women.110 Consistent with the racial and class-based disparities
discussed herein, women of color have been targeted for compulsory testing,
forced medical procedures, and the criminalization of behaviors during preg-
nancy,111 which disproportionately jeopardizes their health and legal rights.112
danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger”); Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 873 (Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that a psychiatrist’s duty to warn can be triggered by statements
made to an immediate family member of the patient); Ewing v. Northridge Hosp. Med.
Ctr., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 596 (Ct. App. 2004) (same).
106 See Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657,
1663 (2008) (“Policing wombs brings private, intimate spaces into the public theatre,
creating spectacles of poor, pregnant women and their children; and this public humilia-
tion functions to visually inscribe these women’s place in the social hierarchy.”).
107 Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fidu-
ciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 454–55 (2000) (arguing
that that the doctor’s role in generating maternal-fetal conflicts violates the legal and
ethical norms that govern doctor-patient relationships).
108 Id.
109 E.g., Press Release, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Florida Hospital Says It
Will Force Pregnant Woman to Have Cesarean Surgery (July 25, 2014), http://advocates-
forpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/07/press_release_florida_hospital.php [http://perma
.cc/3AEG-QUZ6].
110 Doctors have forced pregnant women to be tested for HIV and receive treatment
and have sought criminal sanctions against women for using cigarettes, alcohol, or drugs
while pregnant. Joanne E. Brosh & Monica K. Miller, Regulating Pregnancy Behaviors:
How the Constitutional Rights of Minority Women Are Disproportionately Compromised,
16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 438–39 (2008); Carolyn Coffey, Note,
Whitner v. State: Aberrational Judicial Response or Wave of the Future for Maternal
Substance Abuse Cases?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 211, 211 (1997) (finding
that over a twenty-year period, criminal charges for endangering fetuses during preg-
nancy through “drug use or other actions” were brought against more than two hundred
women in thirty states).
111 See generally Ian Vandewalker, Taking the Baby Before It’s Born: Termination of
the Parental Rights of Women Who Use Illegal Drugs While Pregnant, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 423 (2008) (discussing how women who have disclosed using illegal
substances while pregnant have had their parental rights terminated before the baby’s
birth, irrespective of the health effects on the fetus).
112 See Carla-Michelle Adams, Criminalization in Shades of Color: Prosecuting
Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 89, 105 (2013) (identify-
ing that pregnant African American women are tested and reported for drug use more
frequently than any other racial or ethnic group, although drug use occurs across all races
and classes); Brosh & Miller, supra note 110, at 438–39. See generally Ira J. Chasnoff et R
al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies
in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990)
(finding that despite similar rates of substance abuse among African American and Cau-
casian women, African American women were reported ten times more often than Cauca-
sian women, and poor women were most frequently reported, and concluding that legally
mandated reporting is racially and economically biased).
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When someone who experiences domestic violence seeks state help, his
or her actions to date and future plans become subject to scrutiny. Advocates
or those in helping roles can believe they have the solution for ending abuse
and substitute their judgment for that of the survivors, often involving state
mechanisms beyond survivors’ wishes.
B. Mandatory Reporters in Family Justice Centers
1. Safety Advocates
Safety is the primary stated goal of Family Justice Centers, and each
survivor who enters a Family Justice Center has the opportunity to meet with
a safety advocate to discuss the survivor’s situation and plan for his or her
future safety.113 These advocates are typically employed by local nonprofit
agencies, although some are employees of prosecutors’ offices.114 States have
increasingly passed laws that extend the patient-psychotherapist privilege to
varying degrees to protect communications between a domestic violence vic-
tim and safety advocate,115 but the victim-advocate privilege is not failsafe.116
113 Safety Planning: An Essential Tool, FAMILY JUSTICE CTR. ALL., http://www
.familyjusticecenter.org/component/jdownloads/send/44-safety-planning/271-safety-plan
ning-webinar-powerpoint-safety-planning-an-essential-tool-mathews-cunningham-gonza
lez-a-nfjca-05-11.html [http://perma.cc/A43E-98WP] (“accreditors and certifying agen-
cies require safety planning”); see also Services, MONTGOMERY CTY. FAMILY JUSTICE
CTR., http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/fjc/services.html [http://perma.cc/A5U6-
5Z5V]; Services, FAMILY JUSTICE CTR., http://www.fjcsafe.org/buffalo-domestic-vio
lence-services [http://perma.cc/DQ53-GHWX].
114 See Domestic Violence/Stalking Unit, COLUMBUS CITY ATT’Y, http://www
.columbuscityattorney.org/prosecution-dv.aspx [http://perma.cc/KE24-3VF8]; Domestic
Violence Advocacy, ERIE CTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, http://www2.erie.gov/da/index.
php?q=domestic-violence-advocacy [http://perma.cc/HXQ9-WCD7]; Domestic Vio-
lence Victims, SUFFOLK CTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, http://www.suffolkdistrictattorney
.com/victim-assistance/domestic-violence-victims/ [http://perma.cc/WUM8-55N3].
115 Requirements vary by state and may depend on the advocate’s title and possible
licensure. Some state laws prohibit the release of confidential communications between a
victim and advocate without the victim’s consent. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5035 (2014);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6116 (2015). Other states bar disclosure except when it is in the
public interest to disclose the communication. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02(k) (2014).
Finally, some states require disclosure when a court deems it necessary based on the facts
of a case. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1037.2 (West 2015); Commonwealth v. Tripolone,
681 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Mass. 1997) (permitting the defendant to view counseling
records to ensure the right to a fair trial).
116 See Jennifer Bruno, Pitfalls for the Unwary: How Sexual Assault Counselor-Vic-
tim Privileges May Fall Short of Their Intended Protections, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1373,
1374–75 (2002) (detailing how judicial interpretation of confidentiality impairs the effi-
cacy of the privilege); In re Crisis Connection, Inc., 930 N.E.2d 1169, 1190 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010), aff’d on reh’g, 933 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), vacated sub nom. Crisis
Connection, Inc. v. Fromme, 940 N.E.2d 832 (Ind. 2010), adopted in part, vacated in
part, 949 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 2011) (holding that the interest of privacy asserted by counsel-
ing service under victim-advocate privilege was not strong enough to bar an in camera
review of its records relating to defendant’s alleged victims). See generally Baker, supra
note 67. R
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Notwithstanding these laws, safety advocates remain mandatory reporters of
child abuse and neglect.117
Survivors coming to a Family Justice Center are seeking to end violence
and protect themselves and their children. Most people they will encounter
at a Family Justice Center, including safety advocates, are mandatory report-
ers of child abuse and neglect, which is widely defined to include exposure
to or witnessing domestic violence between adults.118 Even if the children are
not physically harmed, being in a household where they see or hear abuse
statutorily constitutes neglect.119 When a survivor indicates that children
were in the house when violence occurred, the mandatory reporter is re-
quired to make a report to Child Protective Services, which can result in a
“failure to protect” charge against the victim parent and removal of children
from the non-violent parent.120 Parent-child relationships are supposed to re-
ceive heightened constitutional protection,121 yet the termination of parent-
child relationships prompted by a victim seeking the State’s help to end
abuse is one of the great paradoxes of domestic violence responses.
Historically, these practices have been carried out in troubling race- and
class-based ways, with Latino and African American children particularly
being removed from their non-abusive parents and these parents losing cus-
tody of their children at alarming rates.122 Child welfare systems exist to
117 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-402 (2015) (listing domestic abuse advocates
and domestic violence shelter employees or volunteers as mandated reporters of child
abuse and neglect); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17a-101; 53a-65 (2015) (listing domestic vio-
lence counselors as mandatory reporters); D.C. CODE § 4-1321.02 (2015) (listing domes-
tic violence counselors as mandatory reporters); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2015)
(including employees or volunteers of domestic abuse shelters as mandatory reporters).
118 See Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel like a Motherless Child: The Error of
Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 601–02 (2004).
119 See Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence:
The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 94–95 (2001).
120 Dunlap, supra note 118, at 585. R
121 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (plurality opinion) (requiring that
courts give “special weight” to fit parents’ preferences regarding non-parent visitation);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 791 (1982) (establishing the due process requirements
that must be met before the State can terminate parental rights); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 207, 234–36 (1972) (permitting Amish parents to withdraw their children from
school after the eighth grade); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(protecting parents’ rights to educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (affirming that parents’ right to educate their children is a constitutionally
protected liberty).
122 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171,
172–73; Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race,
and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 580 (1997) [hereinafter
Appell, Protecting Children] (describing the “policies, practices, and perspectives that
help to fuel the growing industry that has arisen from the state’s ‘protective’ involvement
with poor families and families of color and the state’s punitive treatment of the mothers
of these families.”); Annette R. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood,
34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 770–79 (2001) [hereinafter Appell, Virtual Mothers]
(identifying the predominance of poor families of color in the child protection system);
Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1244 (1999)
(noting that poor women of color are disproportionately more likely to be subject to child
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protect children’s safety; however, structural inequality has plagued child
welfare involvement, which has had vast and harmful consequences on cer-
tain populations.
Child protective system mandates often conflict with a survivor’s auton-
omous choices, raising further issues for survivors seeking help from vio-
lence. Once allegations of “failure to protect” based on domestic violence
are made against a non-abusive parent, this parent is often instructed to make
a police report,123 obtain a civil protection order,124 testify against the bat-
terer,125 or follow other courses of action as conditions of retaining his or her
children. The directive occurs without regard for the victim’s assessment of
the situation and concerns about how the abusive parent will respond, such
as when the victim believes filing a court action will create further danger.126
Furthermore, social science research shows that ending abuse and leaving an
abusive relationship is a process,127 with survivors making an average of five
to seven attempts to leave before successfully being able to do so.128 A survi-
vor who reports abuse at a Family Justice Center and returns to the relation-
ship with his or her partner is prone to suffer consequences of the child
welfare system.129
2. Medical Providers
Some Family Justice Centers include medical professionals to treat inju-
ries on-site or to operate a forensic center to collect evidence for criminal
protection systems and agencies). See generally ROBERTS, supra note 12 (identifying the R
troubling implications of the disproportionate removal of Black and Latino children from
their biological parents by the State).
123
WOMEN’S JUSTICE CENTER, PART 2: TIPS FOR AVOIDING THE ABUSES OF CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR NON-OFFENDING PARENTS, ADVOCATES, AND MANDATED RE-
PORTERS, available at http://justicewomen.com/tips_bewarechildprotectiveservices_2
.html [http://perma.cc/R9PF-2D28] (advising non-offending parents to report suspected
child abuse to law enforcement to prevent against failure to protect charges).
124 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(i) (2015) (identifying filing for a protection
order as a way to show the abused parent is making “reasonable efforts” to protect a
child).
125 Lindauer, supra note 28, at 806. R
126 See Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?: Question-
ing the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 7, 23 (2004) (describing how legal remedies can create dangers for battered
women).
127 See generally Stoever, supra note 40, at 322–32. R
128 Kathleen J. Ferraro, Battered Women: Strategies for Survival, in VIOLENCE BE-
TWEEN INTIMATE PARTNERS: PATTERNS, CAUSES, AND EFFECTS 124, 133 (Albert P.
Cardarelli ed., 1997).
129 See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from
Welfare “Reform,” Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 718 (1998)
(“Most statutes fail to take into account the context within which a mother exercises her
caretaking responsibilities. Mothers tried under these statutes are convicted if their at-
tempts to protect their children are ineffective, or if fear for their safety or their children’s
safety effectively prevents intervention.”).
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and civil cases.130 All of these medical providers are mandatory reporters of
child abuse and elder abuse.131 In many states, medical personnel also have
statutorily-mandated reporting obligations concerning domestic violence.132
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have statutes that require or
encourage medical professionals to report certain types of injuries to law
enforcement or other state officials,133 and some states specifically address
injuries caused by domestic violence.134
Statutes that require mandatory reporting of domestic violence by
health professionals have been critiqued on multiple bases, including the
concern that they conflict with patients’ rights and physicians’ responsibili-
ties. For example, the American Medical Association has rejected mandatory
reporting laws because they “violate the basic tenets of medical ethics and
are of unproven value.”135 Some survivors may avoid seeking medical care
for injuries if there is a threat of mandatory reporting. Mandatory reporting
has also been argued to interfere with patient confidentiality and autonomy
and to “result in biased case identification.”136 The unfortunate outcome of
mandatory reporting by health care providers is that survivors may forego
needed medical treatment when forced to choose between criminal justice or
child welfare involvement and their health. Other survivors will not realize
that seeking medical help will lead to greater state involvement and
monitoring.
3. Child Support Administrators
Some Family Justice Centers include representatives from state attorney
general’s offices who automatically initiate child support cases against non-
custodial parents. This structure automatically starts a case against alleged
abusers, which is paradoxical because domestic violence is one of the few
reasons that a custodial parent can opt out of cooperating with the govern-
130 See, e.g., Gael Strack & Eugene Hyman, Your Patient. My Client. Her Safety: A
Physician’s Guide to Avoiding the Courtroom While Helping Victims of Domestic Vio-
lence, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 33, 38 (2008) (describing the Forensic Medical
Unit at the San Diego Family Justice Center).
131 Laura G. Iavicoli, Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence: The Law, Friend
or Foe?, 72 MT. SINAI J. MED. 228, 229 (2005).
132 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.2 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-
135 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209A.030(2) (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 631:6 (West 2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 91.003 (West 2014).
133 Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They
Promote Patient Well-being?, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1781, 1786 (1995); see, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 790.24 (2014); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/3.2 (2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25
(McKinney 2014).
134 Infra note 249 and accompanying text. R
135




136 Hyman et al., supra note 133, at 1786. R
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ment in a child support case.137 In addition to disregarding Congress’s crea-
tion of the waivers, the automatic filing of a child support case denies
survivors the ability to choose financial options that protect them from hav-
ing to engage with abuse perpetrators and that work best for their
circumstances.
Welfare regulations originally mandated that custodial parents cooper-
ate with the establishment of paternity and collection of child support from
the non-custodial parent, even in the context of domestic violence.138 When
Congress later recognized the danger of the courtroom setting and potential
for renewed violence,139 it created the “good cause” waiver to the former
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program140 and the Family Vio-
lence Option to the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program.141
Both the waiver and the Family Violence Option permit state child support
agencies to waive the child support cooperation requirements for victims of
domestic violence.142 While waivers are not regularly provided and there
have been problems with the implementation of both exceptions,143 their
adoption signals recognition of the danger that survivors face when they are
required to come to court for an adversarial proceeding and continually reen-
gage with an abusive partner.
Economic security is crucial to ending violence, so survivors should
have the option to initiate a child support case at a Family Justice Center.
The option, however, should be accompanied by counseling about the court
process and court dates, the potential danger attendant to repeatedly encoun-
tering the abusive partner, and an estimation of the economic benefit. To this
end, a government representative should provide an estimated calculation of
the anticipated child support award based on the child support guidelines.
While child support orders may financially help some survivors provide for
their children, someone receiving welfare benefits or Temporary Assistance
137 See Naomi Stern, Battered by the System: How Advocates Against Domestic Vio-
lence Have Improved Victims’ Access to Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTINGS WO-
MEN’S L.J. 47, 49 (2003).
138 See id. at 51–53.
139 See id. at 49 (“Because of a batterer’s desire to control his former partner, his
contact with her in a courtroom setting could result in renewed violence against her.
Paradoxically, therefore, many low-income victims of domestic violence who are leaving
or who have already left their abusers often must choose between poverty and increased
violence for themselves and their children at their abusers’ hands.”).
140 See 45 C.F.R. § 232.40 (1997); Stern, supra note 137, at 49. R
141 See Stern, supra note 137, at 49; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Pro- R
gram: Eighth Report to Congress 131–32, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
(2009), http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/annualreport8/ar8index.htm
[http://perma.cc/PE64-8D9S] (reporting that thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico have adopted the Family Violence Option).
142 45 C.F.R. § 232.40; Stern, supra note 137, at 49. R
143 Taryn Lindhorst & Julianna D. Padgett, Disjunctures for Women and Frontline
Workers: Implementation of the Family Violence Option, 79 SOC. SERV. REV. 405, 407,
409 (2005); Katie Scrivner, Domestic Violence Victims After Welfare Reform: Looking
Beyond the Family Violence Option, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 241, 249–50 (2001).
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to Needy Families signs over the right to collect child support up to the
TANF grant amount.144 If the government is solely going to recoup the child
support and fails to provide the waiver options, this is likely not in a survi-
vor’s best interest and the child support agency does not seem to be an ap-
propriate partnering agency at a Family Justice Center.
C. Criminal Justice Actors
Under the current legal regime, domestic violence is foremost “a public
crime,” as reflected in mandatory criminal interventions.145 Many of these
compulsory criminal interventions have had unexpected consequences for
abuse survivors, whether by bringing victims into the criminal justice system
as defendants or denying victims’ autonomy by proceeding without acknowl-
edging their wishes or safety interests. For example, mandatory arrest poli-
cies, which require police to make an arrest if they have probable cause to
believe domestic violence has occurred,146 have resulted in dramatically in-
creased rates of arrest and prosecution of abuse survivors.147 Under “no
drop” prosecution policies, the State often pursues criminal charges even
against the survivor’s wishes, as when the survivor believes that prosecution
is contrary to his or her safety or economic interests.148 These arrest and
prosecution policies persist even though research shows that survivors’
144 42 U.S.C §608(a)(3) (2012); see also Stern, supra note 137, at 51. R
145 Houston, supra note 21, at 271–72. R
146 See April M. Zeoli et al., A Summary and Analysis of Warrantless Arrest Statutes
for Domestic Violence in the United States, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2811, 2814
(2011); see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307(b)(1) (2015).
147 See Jessica Dayton, The Silencing of a Woman’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and
No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J.
281, 287 (2003) (discussing a Los Angeles study that found that three times as many
women were arrested for domestic abuse after a mandatory arrest statute was adopted);
Osthoff, supra note 37, at 1533 (“One of the unintended consequences of intensive arrest R
policies has been the arrest of large numbers of battered women, especially women of
color.”); see also David Hirschel & Eve Buzawa, Understanding the Context of Dual
Arrest with Directions for Future Research, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1449, 1459
(2002) (identifying how gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender victims are particularly
vulnerable to dual arrests); Miller, supra note 104, at 1343 (finding that mandatory arrest R
policies lead to an increase in dual arrests, even in jurisdictions with policies recom-
mending only the arrest of the primary aggressor); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and
the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
1657, 1680 (2004) (“Arrests of abused women have increased because officers have been
either unable or unwilling to determine the initiator of the violence.”).
148 Stoever, supra note 40, at 314; see also LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: R
RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 40–43 (2003) (citing studies which
found that domestic violence recidivism rates are lower in drop-permitted jurisdictions
and higher when victims feel the police are not acting in the victims’ interest); Jo Dixon,
Mandatory Domestic Violence Arrest and Prosecution Policies: Recidivism and Social
Governance, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 663, 665 (2009) (indicating that most juris-
dictions have adopted some form of mandatory prosecution).
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safety and autonomy increase when their input is used in decisions about
criminal intervention.149
This section explores how Family Justice Centers promote increased
criminal justice involvement and describes the consequences visited on sur-
vivors and their families.
1. Police
Police are foundational to every Family Justice Center, and all survivors
who enter a Family Justice Center are offered the opportunity to meet with a
police officer.150
Police involvement in domestic violence situations can occur in a vari-
ety of ways. Most commonly, survivors in the midst of violence may call the
police to achieve an immediate end to violence. The call to police, however,
should not be equated with a desire for arrest.151 A survivor coming to a
Family Justice Center after experiencing abuse will typically be offered the
opportunity to make a police report to document the abuse.152 Similar to the
survivor whose calls to police may not mean a desire for arrest, a survivor
seeking help at a Family Justice Center may simply intend to create a record
without understanding that the officer then presents the police report to the
prosecuting attorney’s office for criminal charges to be brought. The police
report thus sets into motion a criminal case, the implications of which are
described in the next section.
The prominence of police in Family Justice Centers should be viewed in
the context of how criminal justice responses have historically harmed com-
149 See David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife As-
saulters: Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT 127,
142, 156–57 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (finding that giving women the choice of whether
to drop criminal charges against the abuser gives women bargaining power that enhances
their safety); David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, The Voices of Domestic Violence Vic-
tims: Predictors of Victim Preference for Arrest and the Relationship Between Preference
for Arrest and Revictimization, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 313, 330–32 (2003) (finding a sig-
nificant association between an abuse victim’s desire for arrest and subsequent violence
experienced and recommending that police take into account the victim’s requests regard-
ing arrest). See generally Coker, supra note 21 (exploring the dangers that aggressive R
criminal responses pose to battered women).
150 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 91. R
151 See Kohn, supra note 84, at 202–03; see also Hannah Brenner, Transcending the R
Criminal Law’s “One Size Fits All” Response to Domestic Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 301, 305 (2013) (discussing mandatory arrest policies and explaining that
“by forcing state intervention, a victim has no right to exercise an opinion about whether
arresting the perpetrator is desirable”).
152 See, e.g., The Family Justice Center Approach, FAM. JUST. CTR. ALL., http://www
.familyjusticecenter.org/the-family-justice-center-approach.html [http://perma.cc/RVQ5-
QVXC] (“The core concept is to provide one place where victims can go to talk to an
advocate, plan for their safety, interview with a police officer, meet with a prosecutor,
receive medical assistance, receive information on shelter, and get help with
transportation.”).
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munities of color.153 Certain individuals, such as battered women, poor per-
sons of color, and undocumented immigrants, are already “vulnerable to
intersecting layers of government control” through child welfare, criminal
justice, and public benefits programs, and they risk further governmental
entanglement and intrusion when calling upon the criminal justice system.154
Social science research confirms that communities that experience abusive
encounters with law enforcement are less likely to seek help from police.155
Further, the mandatory arrest policies enacted as part of the criminaliza-
tion of domestic violence have resulted in increased arrests of survivors,
with the consequences exacerbated for women of color.156 When a victim is
wrongfully arrested, this further enhances the abuser’s control and interferes
with the survivor’s ability to get help from services designated for “vic-
tims.”157 One scholar observes: “It is ironic to note, by holding the state
accountable for women’s safety through changes in law enforcement prac-
tices, many victims of ongoing battering have ended up with less protection
and fewer services and have been labeled as a defendant.”158
2. Prosecution
The Family Justice Center model was chiefly created by two former
prosecutors in San Diego.159 Representatives of a prosecutor’s office—
whether they are prosecuting attorneys or victim/witness advocates—are
153 See Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of
Race, Class, and Gender: Challenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence
Against Marginalized Women in Diverse Communities, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
38, 55 (2005); see also Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construc-
tion of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. &
POL’Y 463, 506 (1996) (“Dependence on initiatives which are strategies for authorizing
state involvement in individual relationships have proved debilitating for communities of
color and women.”).
154 Donna Coker, Race, Poverty, and the Crime-Centered Response to Domestic Vio-
lence: A Comment on Linda Mills’s Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Inti-
mate Abuse, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1331, 1332 (2004).
155 Cf. Sokoloff & Dupont, supra note 153, at 55. R
156 Susan L. Miller & Michelle L. Meloy, Women’s Use of Force: Voices of Women
Arrested for Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 89, 89 (2006) (“Follow-
ing changes in law enforcement policies that encourage or mandate arrest of domestic
violence offenders, a concomitant increase in women arrested and mandated to batterer
treatment programs has resulted. Most research findings, however, suggest that hetero-
sexual intimate violence is gendered, with abuse, power, and control wielded by men
over their female partners, and that when women use violence, it is typically in self-
defense or for nonaggressive reasons.”); Osthoff, supra note 37, at 1533 (noting the dis- R
proportionate impact on and the heightened arrests of women of color when the battered
women’s movement began relying on the criminal legal system). See generally RICHIE,
supra note 37 (illustrating how African American women in low-income communities R
are constrained by competing forces of unmet need and limited resources).
157 See Hirschel & Buzawa, supra note 147, at 1459. R
158 Miller & Meloy, supra note 156, at 91 (citations omitted). R
159 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 83–87. R
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part of every Center, and prosecutor’s offices oversee some of the Centers.160
Given the prominence of criminal justice actors and potential for increased
collaboration between police and prosecution, it is not surprising that the
Family Justice Center model has produced increased rates of prosecution for
domestic violence.161
Regarding the survivor’s interaction with the prosecution, the prosecu-
tor may not make it clear that he or she is not the survivor’s attorney. In-
stead, the prosecutor represents the State, and the survivor is merely a
witness in the Government’s case.162 There is no privilege or confidentiality
with respect to the prosecutor-witness relationship.163 Similarly, a survivor
speaking with a victim-witness advocate from the prosecutor’s office may
not understand that this person is an agent of the prosecution and the infor-
mation the survivor provides can help the Government bring a criminal ac-
tion against the alleged abuser.
Although discussions with a prosecutor’s office are often labeled “con-
fidential,” this is inaccurate, as the conversations are not privileged, the gov-
ernment actors are mandatory reporters, and there are other legal limits of
any possible claim to confidentiality. Under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecu-
tion must turn over to the defense any evidence that is material and poten-
tially exculpatory to the defendant.164 The rule applies to all members of the
“prosecution team,” including prosecution, law enforcement, and victim-
witness advocates who work for the prosecution or law enforcement.165
Although they use the title “advocate” that is also used by safety plan-
ning advocates with community organizations, victim-witness advocates
from a prosecutor’s office can be called as witnesses in cases.166 The creators
160 See, e.g., Family Justice Center, OFFICE OF THE DIST. ATT’Y CTY. OF RIVERSIDE,
http://rivcoda.org/opencms/victimwitness/fjc/index.html [http://perma.cc/H5EU-KU63].
161 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 103–04. R
162
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVES-
TIGATIONS 1 (3d ed. 2014) (“Their client is the public, not victims and not the police.
Thus, prosecutors are expected to make decisions in the best interest of that client, both in
what cases they bring and how they investigate and prosecute them.”).
163 Stacy Caplow, What if There Is No Client?: Prosecutors as “Counselors” of
Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 21 (1998) (“Since there is no attorney-client privi-
lege, nothing revealed by the victim to the prosecutor is confidential—a lack of privacy
that exposes the victim’s story and interests to an audience of strangers. Indeed, most
prosecutors freely disclose facts and feelings disclosed by victims to the judge and de-
fense attorney to advance plea negotiations.”).
164 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
165 Com. v. Bing Sial Liang, 747 N.E.2d 112, 116 (2001) (finding that advocates are
employees of the prosecution and holding that prosecutors are subject to a duty to dis-
close exculpatory evidence that victim advocates obtain from conversations with victims
or witnesses).
166 See Baker, supra note 67, at 323–24 (discussing the waiver of privilege resulting R
from a survivor’s decision to allow an advocate to remain present when discussing confi-
dential matters with his or her attorney); SANDRA TIBBETTS MURPHY, BATTERED WO-
MEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, ADVOCACY CHALLENGES IN A CCR: PROTECTING
CONFIDENTIALITY WHILE PROMOTING A COORDINATED RESPONSE 8–9 (2011) http://www
.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/advocacy_challenges_protecting_confidentiality_while_
promoting_coordination.pdf [http://perma.cc/L32D-PPXY].
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of the Family Justice Center model state that in the interest of decreasing the
number of times a victim needs to tell his or her story, witness statements
may be video recorded at Family Justice Centers;167 however, this may make
it even easier for this information to be shared outside of the Center. Re-
vealing potentially exculpatory evidence is obviously important, but conver-
sations with prosecutors’ offices should not be labeled “confidential.”
a. How Convictions Impact Families
Someone experiencing domestic abuse is typically instructed to call the
police; however, they are rarely advised of the collateral consequences of
criminal convictions and how criminal justice involvement impacts families.
Criminal convictions “affect almost every aspect of personal and civic life,
limiting the vocational, educational, charitable, financial, political, and do-
mestic opportunities available to people who have been convicted of crimes,
often in unanticipated ways.”168 Financially, convictions can interfere with
or impact employment and occupational licensure;169 eligibility for military
service and law enforcement positions;170 the ability to maintain a driver’s
license;171 access to public housing and rental subsidies;172 public benefits,
167 See Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 98. R
168
COLGATE LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 13, § 2:1; see also; Akiva M. R
Liberman & Jocelyn Fontaine, Reducing Harms to Boys and Young Men of Color from
Criminal Justice Involvement 8, URBAN INSTITUTE (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/de-
fault/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000095-Reducing-Harms-to-Boys-and-Young-Men-
of-Color-from-Criminal-Justice-System-Involvement.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VH8-
HAXM] (“A growing body of methodologically rigorous research shows that involve-
ment in the juvenile justice or criminal justice system increases the chances of further
justice-system involvement, decreases the chances of graduating from high school and
gaining employment, and increases the chances of more offending.”) (citations omitted).
For a compilation of collateral consequences by jurisdiction, see generally AM. BAR
ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 13. R
169 Eugene M. Hyman, The Scarlet Letter and Other Roadblocks to Redemption for
Female Offenders, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 119, 125–28 (2014) (describing how indi-
viduals with criminal records face difficulty finding employment due to a number of
factors, including the increasing use of background checks and the inability of those with
criminal convictions to obtain many professional licenses).
170 See Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8–9 (2005) (discussing the potential negative employment
consequences of a domestic violence conviction on those offenders required to use a
firearm as part of their employment); Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Con-
gress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1437 (2005) (“The Lautenberg firearms ban
may strike some as inconsequential, but it is a particularly severe sanction for convicted
domestic abusers whose jobs require possession of a firearm, including police officers,
prison guards, and military personnel.”); cf. Jo Becker et al., Crimes Often Don’t Cost
Guards Their Jobs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, at 1A (explaining that many
abuse survivors with prison guard partners refuse to cooperate with domestic violence
prosecutions because the Lautenberg firearms ban could result in them losing not only
income, but also housing on state property).
171 See Ann Cammett, Expanding Collateral Sanctions: The Hidden Costs of Aggres-
sive Child Support Enforcement Against Incarcerated Parents, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 313, 316, 325–36 (2006) (discussing suspension of an individual’s driver’s li-
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including welfare benefits,173 government pensions, and veterans’ benefits;
and student loans and educational grants.174 Research consistently shows that
employers are reluctant to hire individuals with criminal records, particularly
if the applicant is African American.175 Further troubling, employers often
unfairly associate African American men with criminality, even in the ab-
sence of a criminal record.176
Regarding civil and political rights, convictions can prevent people
from voting, serving on a jury, or engaging in certain community service.177
State laws frequently prohibit individuals with certain convictions from
working with children, individuals with disabilities, the elderly, and other
vulnerable populations.178 For example, one of my clients was wrongfully
arrested after experiencing two decades of domestic violence, and her de-
fense counsel instructed her to plead guilty to simple assault. As a result of
her criminal record, she is no longer able to volunteer to read to children at
the local hospital, an activity that previously brought joy to hospitalized chil-
dren and increased her sense of self-worth.
The family structure and relationships can also suffer due to criminal
convictions. Judges often order criminal restraining orders that prohibit con-
tact between the defendant and his or her family without the abused individ-
ual’s knowledge.179 Such orders legally impose separation and produce a “de
cense due to a criminal conviction, particularly for a drug offense, and the consequences
of license suspension).
172 The Supreme Court has upheld lease terms permitting housing authorities to evict
so-called “innocent” parties on the basis of criminal activity undertaken by persons under
their control. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
173 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 862a(a) (West 2015) (prohibiting anyone convicted of a
state or federal drug felony from receiving welfare benefits).
174
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Who Gets Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/
eligibility [http://perma.cc/RB23-RD3J] (explaining that those with criminal convictions
may have limited or no eligibility for federal student aid).
175 Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing
Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 195, 209 (2009).
176 For a brief overview of implicit bias and discriminatory associations of Blackness
with criminality, see Liberman & Fontaine, supra note 168, at 5–6. R
177 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 13013(c)(2)(F) (West 2015) (banning court-appointed
special advocate programs from accepting as volunteers people “who have been con-
victed of, have charges pending for, or have in the past been charged with, a felony or
misdemeanor involving a sex offense, violent act, child abuse or neglect, or related acts
that would pose risks to children or to the court-appointed special advocate program’s
credibility”); 45 C.F.R. § 2522.230(b)(2) (2010) (stating that an AmeriCorps volunteer
will be released for cause if convicted of a felony or the sale or distribution of drugs
during the term of service); see also Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking
Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1793 (2012)
(describing the historical punishment of civil death during colonial times and “its revival
in the form of a system of collateral consequences imposed by positive law based on
criminal conviction.”).
178 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-13-2(31) (2015); see also Hyman, supra note 169, at R
126–27 (discussing how a criminal conviction can jeopardize the employment of the
nearly 28 million women who work as caretakers, including those who work caring for
their own family members).
179 See Suk, supra note 13, at 48. R
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facto divorce.”180 Parental rights may be terminated, whether because of the
nature of the conviction or the time incarcerated, and convictions often bar
certification as a foster parent.181 Immigration consequences of criminal jus-
tice involvement can also separate families. Undocumented survivors often
fear that if they utilize criminal justice resources, they will be deported, as
borne out by the recent use of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents
as interpreters for law enforcement.182 A survivor may be dependent on a
spouse who is a citizen, legal permanent resident, or visa holder for the sur-
vivor’s immigration status.183 A survivor whose partner is undocumented
may avoid criminal justice involvement so that the partner is not deported,184
which would deprive the survivor of economic, emotional, or parenting
support.185
These statutorily and administratively imposed sanctions dramatically
and disproportionately disenfranchise people of color, harming their employ-
ment prospects and denying their civil participation.186 Moreover, criminal
justice involvement may not actually increase the survivor’s safety; in some
cases, arrest or prosecution results in greater violence to the survivor.187 Fi-
180 See id. at 8.
181
COLGATE LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 13, § 2:25–28. R
182 See generally Lornet Turnbull, Bias Seen in Forest Service Practice on Olympic
Peninsula, SEATTLE TIMES, June 1, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2018327
993_forks01m.html [http://perma.cc/Z4FG-ST3X] (discussing the USDA’s ruling against
the use of Border Patrol agents as language interpreters for non-English speakers).
183 See Sabrina Balgamwalla, Bride and Prejudice: How U.S. Immigration Law Dis-
criminates Against Spousal Visa Holders, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 25, 58
(2014) (describing the challenges of relying on current immigration remedies for abuse
and noting that an arrest or conviction for domestic violence may affect the principal’s
immigration status, thereby compromising the status of dependent family members); see
also Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 209–14 (1999) (discussing
the adverse consequences that may result from the arrest of a noncitizen for domestic
violence).
184 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012) (making a crime a deportable offense if it
took place within an intimate relationship and defining crimes of domestic violence to
include violent crimes perpetrated against a spouse or child or anyone similarly situated,
as well as related crimes such as stalking and violation of a protective order).
185 Goodmark, supra note 126, at 37. R
186 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERA-
TION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that the criminal justice system
unfairly targets communities of color, keeping African American men in a cycle of pov-
erty and imprisonment).
187 See Ahmet Çelik, An Analysis of Mandatory Arrest Policy on Domestic Violence,
10 INT’L. J. HUM. SCI. 1503, 1518 (2013); see also Richard A. Berk et al., A Bayesian
Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 170, 198 (1992) (finding that arrest sometimes made abuse worse); Randal B. Frit-
zler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in the
Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28, 33 (2000) (reporting that as many as fifty percent of abusive
partners threaten victims with violence during domestic violence prosecutions); Stephen
Goldsmith, Taking Spouse Abuse Beyond a “Family Affair,” 17 LAW ENFORCEMENT
NEWS 7, 7 (1991) (describing how prosecution may prompt violence and reporting that
thirty percent of batterers actually assault victims during the predisposition phase of a
prosecution); David Hirschel et al., The Failure of Arrest to Deter Spouse Abuse, 29 J.
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nally, the social ramifications are often considerable. I will always remem-
ber a client who, when given the option of pursuing contempt charges
against her ex-husband for the nonpayment of child support, said, “I don’t
want my son to have to go to school knowing his dad is in jail, and I don’t
want him to think I’m responsible. Worse yet, I don’t want my son to think
his dad is in jail because of him.” Because criminal justice involvement
potentially carries a multitude of negative safety, economic, and social
ramifications, abuse survivors often do not wish to cooperate with the prose-
cution in bringing and pursuing criminal charges. With violence against an
intimate partner now viewed as a crime against the state and a public harm,
the survivor is denied autonomy in voicing what is best for his or her safety
and goals.188 This situation arguably substitutes the State’s control for the
abuser’s control.
b. Post-Crawford Pressure on Victims
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford v. Washington189 and Davis
v. Washington190 have considerably impeded domestic violence prosecutors’
ability to pursue cases without victim testimony. Significant to the Family
Justice Center environment, prosecution now subjects survivors to increased
pressure in light of the post-Crawford obstacles to victimless prosecution.191
Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause generally requires the exclu-
sion of “testimonial” out-of-court statements against a defendant.192 Follow-
ing Davis, to determine what constitutes “testimonial” hearsay statements,
courts employ a framework that posits a binary relationship between merely
providing information for investigatory purposes and statements made in a
situation of exigency, emergency, or “crying for help.”193 Because prosecu-
tors must now dismiss a large number of cases where victims are unavailable
or uncooperative,194 and defendants charged with domestic violence crimes
are now less likely to plead guilty and more likely to take their cases to
RES. CRIME & DELINQ., 7, 29 (1992) (finding that official reports and victim reports
showed that arrest was not a deterrent for misdemeanor spouse abusers).
188 The central role of police and prosecution in Family Justice Centers can be viewed
alongside the anti-essentializing critiques of the mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecu-
tion policies that developed during the 1990s, which deny the survivor a voice in arrest
and prosecution decisions. See generally Goodmark, supra note 20 (arguing that domes- R
tic violence law developed primarily around concerns for safety and batterer accountabil-
ity rather than survivor autonomy).
189 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
190 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
191 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of
Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (2006).
192 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
193 Id. at 7.
194 Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 820
(2005) (reporting survey results indicating that prosecutors were more likely to dismiss
cases post-Crawford).
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trial,195 survivors may be subject to increased pressure or coercion from
prosecution.196
c. Use of Self-Incriminating Statements Against Survivors
Many abuse survivors are accused of committing crimes that are related
to their experience of violence.197 Some abusive partners coerce their victims
into committing criminal acts; for example, the abuser may prostitute the
victim or force the victim to steal.198 Other survivors experiencing poverty
commit economic crimes, such as forgery or theft.199 When survivors defend
themselves against their abusers, they are often charged with assault or
homicide.200 When survivors flee with their children, they may be charged
with kidnapping or custodial interference.201 Drug-related charges are also
common, as survivors may use alcohol or drugs to self-medicate and numb
the pain, or because abusers may intentionally encourage drug use so that the
addicted survivor is further dependent on the abuser.202 In sum, there are
multiple ways in which abuse survivors may be charged with crimes related
directly or indirectly to the battering.
195 Id.
196 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. State pressure includes the threat of R
having bench warrants issued against abuse survivors if they fail to appear and testify.
David Ford, Coercing Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 18 J. IN-
TERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 669, 671 (2003) (identifying how under “no drop” prosecution
policies, victims are told that if they do not appear in response to a subpoena to testify,
they will be arrested and jailed).
197 See generally Moore, supra note 59 (describing the connections between the R
abuse that women suffer and the crimes they commit and examining the economic barri-
ers to escaping abuse, including the “systemic impediments” created through welfare
reform).
198 See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defend-
ants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 254–55 (2003) (discussing
the correlation between intimate partner violence and prostitution); Nancy Romero-Daza
et al., “Nobody Gives a Damn if I Live or Die”: Violence, Drugs, and Street-level Prosti-
tution in Inner-city Hartford, Connecticut, 22 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY. 233, 250 (2003)
(identifying that over seventy-five percent of the women interviewed reported experienc-
ing domestic violence, and describing how women involved in prostitution often do not
believe anyone will help or believe them).
199
RICHIE, supra note 37, at 118–20. R
200 See generally Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Wo-
man? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008) (describing how
battered women are urged to tailor their stories to fit a prevailing narrative of helplessness
in order to receive legal assistance).
201 See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Pro-
tect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 245 (1996);
Myrna S. Raeder, Preserving Family Ties for Domestic Violence Survivors and Their
Children by Invoking A Human Rights Approach to Avoid the Criminalization of Mothers
Based on the Acts and Accusations of Their Batterers, 17 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 105,
112–13 (2014).
202 See RICHIE, supra note 37, at 83, 150. R
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Many victims of battering are arrested after acting in self-defense or
after being falsely accused of violence.203 A survivor’s use of violence may
also be an expression of anger, frustration, or stress.204 When an abuse survi-
vor uses violence to try to stop or escape abuse, the incident-based criminal
justice system typically does not take a contextualized view of their actions.
A survivor’s “single act of violence . . . can eclipse an entire history of
victimization.”205 Among practitioners and scholars, the consensus is that
battering must be explored and evaluated in context, with consideration of
the relationship history and motivation behind any act.206
A survivor being questioned by police or prosecutors may unwittingly
report information that results in criminal charges being brought against the
survivor. Abuse survivors who fight back or use force are more likely to
report what they did and how they did it, in comparison with the abuser who
denies any wrongdoing.207 Researchers have found that women are generally
less savvy about the operation of the criminal justice system than men,208 and
because women are not socialized to use violence, they remember incidents
more distinctly than men.209 Studies show that women experience a variety
of pressures—including family responsibilities, coercion, and threats—that
make them “more compliant to the suggestions of police and prosecu-
tors.”210 Multiple studies have shown that women are commonly pressured
by both prosecutors and their own defense counsel to forego a trial and plead
guilty, even when they feel they were wrongly arrested.211
Survivors who are arrested for domestic assault are typically treated as
batterers by the police, courts, and service providers,212 including actors
203 See Osthoff, supra note 42, at 1532. Multiple researchers have found that wo- R
men’s use of violence in relationships is almost always an attempt to stop or escape
violence. See Shamita Das Dasgupta, A Framework for Understanding Women’s Use of
Non-lethal Violence in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WO-
MEN 1364, 1372 (2002); Michael S. Kimmel,“Gender Symmetry” in Domestic Violence:
A Substantive and Methodological Research Review, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
1301, 1354 (2002); L. Kevin Hamberger & Clare E. Guse, Men’s and Women’s Use of
Intimate Partner Violence in Clinical Samples, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1305, 1307
(2002).
204 Miller & Meloy, supra note 156, at 93. R
205 Id. at 92.
206 See Osthoff, supra note 37, at 1526–28. R
207 See, e.g., Russell P. Dobash et al., Separate and Intersecting Realities: A Compar-
ison of Men’s and Women’s Accounts of Violence Against Women, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 382, 405–06 (1998).
208 Miller, supra note 104, at 1355–56. R
209 See Shamita Das Dasgupta, Just Like Men? A Critical Review of Violence by Wo-
men, in COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM
DULUTH AND BEYOND 195, 199–201 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen L. Pence eds., 1999);
Kimmel, supra note 201, at 1344. R
210 Stephen Jones, Under Pressure: Women Who Plead Guilty to Crimes They Have
Not Committed, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 77, 82–84 (2011).
211 Carol Jacobsen et al., Battered Women, Homicide Convictions, and Sentencing:
The Case for Clemency, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 55 (2007); see also Miller, supra
note 104, at 1360–63. R
212 Osthoff, supra note 37, at 1525. R
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within a Family Justice Center. They are denied access to domestic violence
shelters and advocacy services due to their offender classification and are
frequently ordered into batterer intervention treatment.213
In the Family Justice Center setting, survivors should be counseled
about what it means to make a police report or talk to a prosecutor and the
immediate and collateral consequences of criminal justice involvement. In
addition to being warned of the potential effects of engaging criminal justice
responses, survivors should also be notified that representatives of the prose-
cutor’s office and other agencies are mandatory reporters of child abuse.
D. Other Paths to State Involvement
1. Protection Order Remedies
There are numerous other ways in which domestic violence responses,
including civil remedies, create paths to criminal justice involvement. Civil
protection orders are the most commonly sought legal remedy by abuse sur-
vivors.214 In civil and criminal domestic violence cases, courts routinely or-
der the respondent or defendant to complete a batterer intervention
program.215 Respondents are typically required to pay for these programs,216
which range in duration from eight to fifty-two weeks depending on the
jurisdiction.217 Many batterer intervention programs are actually run by pro-
bation departments; respondents in civil cases thus essentially find them-
213 Miller & Meloy, supra note 156, at 90. R
214 Stoever, supra note 40, at 308; Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System Re- R
sponses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case Management
and Technology Solutions, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATE-
GIES 147, 149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002) (finding that survivors are more likely to seek
relief from violence solely in the civil system through protection orders, as compared to
using the criminal justice system); see also Goldfarb, supra note 98, at 1489 (citing civil R
protection orders as the “most commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”);
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2005 A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 38 (Richard Y. Schauffler et al. eds., 2006) (reporting the
protection order caseloads in twenty-seven states in 2005 and finding that around 600,000
protection orders were sought in the selected states that year).
215 See Bruce Dalton, What’s Going on Out There? A Survey of Batterer Intervention
Programs, 15 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 59, 60 (2007).
216 See ALA. CODE § 30-7-6, (c) (Eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (requiring that batterer interven-
tion programs be funded by fees collected from attendees unless such programs are subsi-
dized); FLA. STAT § 741.325 (e) (West 2015) (same); LA. STAT § 14:35.3 (H) (West
2015) (requiring that offenders pay for all costs associated with court required domestic
abuse intervention programs unless financially unable); N.Y. FAM. CT. § 842 (West
2015) (requiring respondent to pay for the cost of any court referred batterer’s program if
he or she has the means to do so); see also Allison Snow Jones, The Cost of Batterer
Intervention Programs: How Much and Who Pays? 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 566,
583–84 (2000) (finding that in 1995, the adjusted, average cost of batterer’s intervention
programs at four different sites ranged between $17 and $22 per session and that “much
of the costs of these programs are borne by the batterers themselves”).
217 Dalton, supra note 215, at 61. R
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selves on probation when they are ordered to attend batterer treatment.218
Some of these probation-run batterer intervention programs also require re-
spondents to submit to drug and alcohol tests, providing another basis for
probation to be revoked.219 Similarly, relief in civil protection orders may
include alcohol or drug treatment,220 programs often administered by proba-
tion departments.221
The use of probation to carry out these civil orders has significant racial
and class-based repercussions. Wealthier respondents can afford private ther-
apy or treatment programs; indigent respondents in these civil cases, con-
versely, find themselves on probation and thus under greater state
surveillance.
2. Age
a. Teen Dating Violence
With increasing awareness of the prevalence of teen dating violence,
domestic abuse service providers have expanded outreach to teen survi-
vors.222 Teenagers coming to a Family Justice Center, however, may unwit-
tingly reveal information about their dating relationships that triggers
mandatory reporting. Child protection laws generally require that medical
professionals, teachers, therapists, social workers, clergy, law enforcement,
guardians ad litem, and other service providers report any crimes involving a
218 David Adams, Treatment Programs for Batterers, 5 CLINICS FAM. PRAC. 159, 161
(2003); see, e.g., COURT SERVS. & OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR D.C., Domestic
Violence Supervision and Treatment, in COMMUNITY SUPERVISION SERVICES OPERATIONS
MANUAL, http://www.csosa.gov/about/policies/css/manual/11chapxi-domviolspvrtreat-
ment-030108.pdf [http://perma.cc/GW5N-M95Q] (describing how the Domestic Vio-
lence Intervention Program is administered by the Special Supervision Services Branch
of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia).
219 See Susan L. Miller et al., One Size Fits All? A Gender-Neutral Approach to a
Gender-Specific Problem: Contrasting Batterer Treatment Programs for Male and Fe-
male Offenders, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 336, 348–49 (2005).
220 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2015) (describing the different forms of relief a
court can award, including medical treatment and counseling programs).
221 See, e.g., Probation Supervision, COURT SERVS. & OFFENDER SUPERVISION
AGENCY FOR D.C., http://www.csosa.gov/supervision/types/probation.aspx [http://perma
.cc/ZT6C-LRX6] (identifying the issuance of a civil protection order as placing a respon-
dent on probation, which then subjects the respondent to the “control, supervision, and
care of the Agency”); Drug Testing, COURT SERVS. & OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY
FOR D.C., http://www.csosa.gov/supervision/accountability/drugtesting.aspx [http://per
ma.cc/TW44-6YSQ] (describing the Agency’s “zero tolerance” policy and drug testing
of all individuals on probation).
222 See Cheryl Hanna, Sex Before Violence: Girls, Dating Violence, and (Perceived)
Sexual Autonomy, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437, 456-57 (2006) (describing that since the
first institution of a statewide initiative addressing teen dating violence in 1993, many
additional programs have developed to address and prevent teen dating violence); Lisa
Vollendorf Martin, What’s Love Got to Do with It: Securing Access to Justice for Teens,
61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2012) (stating that following increased awareness and
activism surrounding the issue of teen dating violence, courts and state legislatures have
created news laws to improve protections for teen survivors).
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minor to law enforcement.223 In addition to instances of sexual assault, coer-
cion, and statutory rape carrying criminal penalties, many states criminalize
and sanction consensual sexual conduct between youth.224 Some states have
even adopted parental liability laws to criminalize a parent who condones or
does not make efforts to prevent his or her youth’s sexual activity.225 In many
states, child protection laws also require that doctors, teachers, therapists,
and other service providers report a minor’s sexual activities and sexual part-
ners to child welfare authorities.226
A teenager seeking assistance from advocates, medical professionals,
law enforcement, clergy, or other actors at a Family Justice Center would
commonly reveal information about being physically or sexually harmed.
Unbeknownst to the teenager, while seeking safety planning and guidance
about legal and health options, he or she could easily provide information
that prompts a Child Protective Services case or criminal case. Mandatory
reporting laws do not include exemptions based on the negative impact re-
porting may have on the teen’s safety and well-being, but instead carry mis-
demeanor or felony charges for the failure to comply with reporting
requirements.227
b. Elder Abuse
Many professionals, including law enforcement officers, doctors,
nurses, psychologists, social workers, and nursing home employees, are re-
quired to report known or suspected abuse of an elder.228 In some states,
223 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-201 to 202 (West 2015) (requiring various
professionals and officials to report any suspected child abuse to department of public
health and human services).
224 Annette R. Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715,
771 (2013) (“The law polices child sex through statutory rape laws, incest bans, and
prohibitions on children themselves having sex.”). See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-1.50 (West 2015) (defining “criminal sexual abuse” to include consensual sexual
conduct between a person under seventeen years old with someone age nine to seventeen
years old); In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (upholding statutory
schemes that criminalize consensual sexual conduct between minors and finding that
when two underage minors have sex, “each is the victim of the other” and can be prose-
cuted); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 14-202.2(a) (West 2015) (criminalizing “indecent liber-
ties with children” when the alleged perpetrator is “[a] person who is under the age of
16 years” in instances in which the alleged victim “is at least three years younger than
the defendant”).
225 See Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy, Please: Should We Punish Parents for Teen-
age Sex?, 89 KY. L.J. 135, 139 (2000).
226 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/11-9.1B (West 2015); Aid for Women v.
Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1116–17, 1121 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that there was not a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits for professionals contesting a Kansas state
law mandating the reporting of any sexual activity involving minors under the age of
sixteen years old).
227 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/11-9.1B (West 2015); Aid for Women, 441
F.3d at 1106–08.
228 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15630–15632 (West 2015); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 26-3.1-102 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1606 (West 2015); see
also William E. Adams, Jr., The Intersection of Elder Law and Criminal Law: More
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attorneys, clergy, financial professionals, teachers, and counselors are also
obliged to report elder mistreatment, abuse, or neglect to a state agency or
department.229 Individuals categorized as “elders” who seek help from a
Family Justice Center will likely encounter multiple people with mandatory
reporting duties.230 Similar to the child welfare system’s removal of children
from a parent’s care, Adult Protective Services’ involvement can result in the
institutionalization of the elder.231
Statutes mandating the reporting of elder abuse were modeled after
child protection laws. These statutes view the State as parens patriae, giving
the State the power to protect those who are unable to protect themselves.232
Many statutes, however, define “elder” based on a certain age, such as sixty
years old, rather than capacity.233 The presumed incapacity to protect oneself,
while arguably applicable to minors, raises constitutional questions when
broadly applied to older adults. Namely, scholars have argued that
mandatory reporting for elders presumes that older adults have reduced ca-
pacity and prioritizes the State’s protective interests over adults’ privacy
rights and autonomy.234
Specific to domestic violence experienced by older adults, caseworkers,
service providers, and others in helping roles often assume that being abused
or remaining in an abusive situation is evidence of incapacity, rather than a
rational choice.235 Older adults, however, may choose not to leave an abusive
partner for the same reasons that younger abuse survivors stay in relation-
ships, including love, hope for change, having children together, religious
reasons, societal expectations and value placed on preserving the family
unit, the economic inability to leave, and the lack of appealing alternatives.
Traffic than One Might Assume, 30 STETSON L. REV. 1331, 1338 (2001) (identifying that
most states have mandatory reporting laws for elder abuse or neglect); Nina A. Kohn,
Second Childhood: What Child Protection Systems Can Teach Elder Protection Systems,
14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 187 (2003) (discussing how the majority of states have
passed mandatory elder abuse reporting laws).
229 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 15:1504(A) (2015); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 48.051(a) (West 2015). See generally Charles Pratt, Banks’ Effectiveness at Reporting
Financial Abuse of Elders: An Assessment and Recommendations for Improvements in
California, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 195 (2003) (identifying the extent and characteristics of
mandatory elder abuse reporting laws).
230 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-3.1-102(1) (2015) (including a list of mandatory re-
porters and encouraging “any other person” to also report the mistreatment or neglect of
an elder).
231 Lawrence R. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder
Abuse: An Inappropriate, Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults,
16 FAM. L.Q. 69, 84–85 (1982); Jennifer Beth Glick, Protecting and Respecting Our
Elders: Revising Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Statutes to Increase Efficacy and
Preserve Autonomy, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 714, 725–26 (2005).
232 Eve M. Brank et al., Potential for Self-Reporting of Older Adult Maltreatment: An
Empirical Examination, 19 ELDER L.J. 351, 353 (2012).
233 See Ruthann M. Macolini, Elder Abuse Policy: Considerations in Research and
Legislation, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 349, 350 (1995).
234 See Brank et al., supra note 232, at 362–63; Faulkner, supra note 231, at 86; R
Glick, supra note 229, at 726–28. R
235 Brank et al., supra note 232, at 362. R
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Indeed, older adults have reported that living with the abuse is often prefera-
ble to the prospect of institutionalization.236 Paradoxically, values of auton-
omy and self-determination permit older adults to refuse life-saving medical
treatment, but mandatory reporting statutes deny their ability to stay in a
relationship in which they experience abuse.237
This section has focused on some of the routine actors present at Family
Justice Centers and the potential consequences of providing information to
various individuals and agencies. Many Family Justice Centers contain other
beneficial resources that do not implicate the reporting concerns discussed
herein. For example, many Centers include a childcare room that permits
survivors to meet with agencies while their children are in a safe play envi-
ronment.238 Some Centers store a limited supply of clothing onsite,239 which
is beneficial to survivors who have fled a dangerous situation without the
ability to pack belongings or to individuals in need of clothing to wear to
court or job interviews. Other Centers have a client technology area with
computer stations for survivors to check email accounts, reconnect with fam-
ily and friends, search for jobs, and create or update resumes.240 Some Cen-
ters also provide transportation assistance.241
Some cities have intake centers that developed prior to or separate from
the Family Justice Center model, many of which raise the same direct and
collateral issues. For example, in Seattle, Washington, the King County
Prosecutor’s Office administers a domestic violence intake center at the King
County Superior Courthouse.242 The advocates are employed by the prosecu-
tor’s office, which triggers many of the issues detailed in this section. Al-
though the District of Columbia courthouse intake center predates the
Family Justice Center in San Diego, it includes police officers and detec-
tives, representatives from the Office of the Attorney General as civil attor-
neys and child support enforcement, prosecutors with the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, and safety planning advocates.243 The issues explored in this section
236 See Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse and the States’ Adult Protective Ser-
vices Response: Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 879 (1991).
237 Brank et al., supra note 232, at 362. R
238 See, e.g., Safety Planning, FAMILY JUSTICE CTR. SONOMA CTY., http://www.fjcsc
.org/services.html#safety [http://perma.cc/C79A-6X5C]; Frequently Asked Questions,
CRYSTAL JUDSON FAMILY JUSTICE CTR., http://www.aplaceofhelp.org/FAQ.aspx [http://
perma.cc/7XYR-LDX8]; Services, FAMILY JUSTICE CTR. GEORGETOWN CTY., http://www
.fjcgeorgetown.org/services [http://perma.cc/HRX3-6QD9].




242 What Is the Protection Order Advocacy Program?, King Cnty. Domestic Violence
Prot. Order Advoc. Program, http://protectionorder.org/?page_id=12 [http://perma.cc/
X2D8-BVBC].
243 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 3, 29-
32 (1999); Domestic Violence Intake Centers, D.C. CTS., http://www.dccourts.gov/inter
net/public/aud_dvu/intake.jsf [http://perma.cc/AZ28-2XLX].
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operate writ large with the co-location of government offices and assurances
of confidentiality, whether or not the center carries the title of Family Justice
Center.
III. REFORMS TO ENHANCE SURVIVORS’ AUTONOMY
AND DECISION MAKING
Abuse survivors’ need for help appears to provide the State with a ratio-
nale for restricting their autonomy and tracking the intimate lives of those
who seek help from Family Justice Centers, rather than promoting the goal
of accountability to survivors. Survivors’ self-determination, empowerment,
and independence could instead be supported through ceasing the Centers’
claims of confidentiality, which make misrepresentations and promote a
false sense of security; reforming certain mandatory reporting laws, which
can endanger survivors and deny their choices regarding governmental in-
volvement; and providing survivors with information and counseling
through Attorney Navigators to permit survivors to make informed deci-
sions. These measures enhance a survivor’s autonomy by accurately advising
the survivor and placing decision-making power with the survivor, who
knows his or her situation, danger, and resources best.244 Many of the pro-
posed normative solutions focus on information provision to survivors due
to the current information asymmetry at Centers and because of how politi-
cally powerful the revelation of information, such as reporting requirements,
could be to abuse survivors. The following mechanisms could mitigate some
of the previously described dangers that currently result from the conse-
quences and contradictions of the Centers’ actions.
A. Cease False Claims of Confidentiality
Many Family Justice Centers prominently advertise themselves as
“confidential,” as detailed in Appendix A. Such advertising makes material
misrepresentations, given the reporting duties and the interests of the actors
housed at the Centers.245 The Centers’ intentions may be to express that a
survivor can receive help without the abusive partner’s knowledge, but even
this cannot be guaranteed. The label of “confidentiality” instead problemati-
cally conveys a promise of security of information that is contrary to the
Centers’ information-sharing design and to the mandatory reporting duties of
most of the professionals survivors encounter at Family Justice Centers. To
244 Stoever, supra note 40, at 314–15 (discussing how a survivor’s agency is often in R
tension with the “intersecting competing coercive forces of state mechanisms of control,”
while noting that supporting survivors’ autonomy is significant and increases survivor
safety).
245 Supra Part II.
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correct the false impression currently given, the Centers should cease mak-
ing claims of confidentiality.
B. Reform Mandatory Reporting
Mandatory reporting laws are premised on the State’s interest in pro-
tecting vulnerable individuals, assuming they lack the decisional capacity to
protect themselves.246 In the Family Justice Center context, abuse survivors
may experience the detrimental effects of mandatory reporting laws as they
affirmatively seek help from abuse.247 The application of such laws at the
time and place someone seeks help can be unnecessary and counterproduc-
tive. The application of mandatory reporting laws to abuse survivors can also
be said to infantilize them, deny their autonomy, be re-victimizing by mir-
roring the abuser’s coercion and control, and unnecessarily interfere with
their parental rights. These “protective” laws can be further critiqued for
disproportionately monitoring and regulating low-income families, and par-
ticularly individuals of color.248
Mandatory reporting is viewed as controversial by physicians, domestic
violence advocates, abuse survivors, scholars, and others,249 given the detri-
mental effects of many mandatory reporting laws. This section proposes
amendments to current mandatory reporting laws to permit professionals to
provide helping services to abuse survivors without necessarily invoking the
criminal or child welfare systems. While the following sections specifically
address (1) absolving medical professionals of their reporting duties and (2)
eliminating “failure to protect” from being exposed to adult intimate partner
246 Brank et al., supra note 232, at 360; see also Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home R
and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 846 (2007) (noting that the State may intervene in
the parent-child relationship to protect a child’s welfare).
247 See Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist
Perspective on Child Abuse, l8 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 97, 105–08 (1988) (finding that
punitive labels and interventions are applied to domestic violence victims by child protec-
tive services workers, and that removal of the child from the non-abusive parent occurs at
much higher rates for battered mothers, as compared to non-battered mothers, even when
the level of child maltreatment is controlled).
248 Supra Part II; see also Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 550 (1999) (arguing that
“[m]andatory state interventions . . . are in danger of replicating the rejection, degrada-
tion, terrorization, social isolation, missocialization, exploitation, emotional unrespon-
siveness, and close confinement that are endemic to the abusive relationship.”).
249 Michael A. Rodrı́guez et al., Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence Injuries
to the Police: What Do Emergency Department Patients Think?, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
580, 580 (2001). While the American Medical Association strongly supports mandatory
reporting of suspected or actual child maltreatment and of elderly abuse, it “opposes the
adoption of mandatory reporting laws for physicians treating competent, non-elderly
adult victims of intimate partner violence if the required reports identify victims” on the
grounds that “[s]uch laws violate basic tenets of medical ethics.” AM. MED. ASS’N,
supra note 135. When California considered legislation to make medical professionals R
mandatory reporters of domestic violence, the California Medical Association was in
opposition. Donna R. Mooney & Michael Rodriguez, California Healthcare Workers and
Mandatory Reporting of Intimate Violence, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 85, 92 (1996).
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violence from the definition of abuse and neglect in child welfare laws, other
areas can be considered. For example, reporting laws that are purely age-
based can be reformed to require consideration of the individual’s capacity.
1. Medical Providers as Independent from the Criminal System
States generally require medical professionals to report to law enforce-
ment patients who receive injuries through illegal acts.250 Some states, in-
cluding California, Colorado, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and
Rhode Island, also specifically require health care professionals to report
domestic violence to the police.251
Supporters of mandatory reporting by medical professionals argue that
it facilitates crime detection, the prosecution of batterers, and data collec-
tion.252 However, many physicians, domestic violence advocates, and abuse
survivors oppose such policies based on concern for survivor safety and au-
tonomy and the interference with medical ethics.253 Regarding the detrimen-
tal effects of mandatory reporting of domestic violence by medical
professionals, abuse survivors report fearing retaliation by the abusive part-
ner and express concern that involving the criminal justice system will lead
to further abuse, separation of their families, or other negative conse-
quences.254 Mandatory reporting of domestic violence forces some abuse vic-
tims to leave their abusive partners before they have considered or
250 Michael A. Rodriguez et al., Patient Attitudes About Mandatory Reporting of Do-
mestic Violence—Implications for Health Care Professionals, 169 W.J. MED. 337, 337
(1998).
251 Rodriguez et al., supra note 249, at 580; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 R
(West 2013) (requiring medical professionals to report to the police any patient they rea-
sonably suspect is suffering from a domestic violence-related injury, and to include in the
written report the victim’s name, whereabouts, and extent of injuries, and the alleged
perpetrator’s identity).
252 Rodriguez et al., supra note 249, at 580; Rodriguez et al., supra note 250, at R
337–38.
253 See Andrea Carlson Gielen et al., Women’s Opinions About Domestic Violence
Screening and Mandatory Reporting, 19 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 279, 282 (2000) (In
a study of nearly 450 women, forty-six percent of whom had experienced intimate partner
violence and fifty-four percent of whom had not, two-thirds of women believed other
women would be less likely to reveal abuse to a health care provider under a mandatory
reporting regime, and one-half of respondents believed such policies put women at in-
creased risk for abuse.); Cris M. Sullivan & Leslie A. Hagen, Survivors’ Opinions About
Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault by Medical Professionals,
20 AFFILIA 346, 346–47 (2005) (In a qualitative study of abuse survivors, sixty of the
sixty-one participants strongly opposed mandatory reporting by health professionals; the
sole person who supported mandatory reporting had been sexually assaulted by a stran-
ger.); see also Kathy Grimley-Baker, Ethical Implications of Mandatory Reporting of
Intimate Partner Violence, 20 CREATIVE NURSING 254, 255 (2014); Annie Jenkin & Jen-
nifer Millward, A Moral Dilemma in the Emergency Room: Confidentiality and Domestic
Violence, 14 ACCIDENT & EMERGENCY NURSING 39–40 (2006); Laura G. Lavicoli,
Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence: The Law, Friend or Foe?, 72 MT. SINAI J.
MED. 228, 229–31(2005).
254 Rodriguez et al., supra note 250, at 338. R
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implemented a safety plan for doing so, thus increasing their risk of serious
injury or homicide.255 Abuse victims also report mistrusting the legal system
based on police officers’ past insensitivity and negative attitudes and delayed
responses to their calls for help, and survivors wish to retain control over the
decision of whether or not to utilize the legal system.256 Survivors also com-
monly identify a preference for confidentiality and autonomy in the physi-
cian-patient relationship and express that mandatory reporting decreases
their trust in their health providers.257
Physicians and abuse survivors indicate that mandatory reporting deters
survivors from receiving needed health care when they believe police inter-
vention could result.258 In a study of over 500 physicians in California, a
majority of respondents reported that mandatory reporting by physicians cre-
ates barriers to health care, may escalate abuse, and violates the basic tenets
of medical ethics of confidentiality and autonomy.259 Given the likelihood of
increased abuse resulting from criminal justice involvement, many physi-
cians are concerned about reporting against their patients’ wishes and inter-
ests.260 In the California study, over half of physicians reported that they may
not comply with the mandatory reporting statute if their patient objects,
given their concerns about the deleterious effects of the law,261 although non-
complying clinicians can face fines of up to $1,000 and jail sentences of up
to six months.262
Domestic violence interventions need to account for safety, confidenti-
ality, and autonomy, all of which support repealing laws that require medical
professionals to make reports to law enforcement that identify the victim and
alleged perpetrator. Physicians should instead be trained to talk to patients
about domestic violence and safety in the home and to interact in nonjudg-
mental, supportive, and empowering ways; offer survivors information and
referrals to domestic violence agencies and counseling services; document
the abuse in the medical chart in the event the survivor wishes to use these
records in the future; and respect survivors’ wishes about disclosure to law
enforcement.263
255 Virginia Daire, The Case Against Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence In-
juries, 74 FLA. B.J. 78, 78–79 (2000).
256 Rodrı́guez et al., supra note 250, at 339. R
257 Id. at 338, 340.
258 Id.
259 Michael Rodriguez et al., Mandatory Reporting of Intimate Partner Violence to
Police: Views of Physicians in California, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 575, 577 (1999).
260 Id.; see also Doug Levy, Doctors Study Fitness of Spouse-Abuse Laws, USA TO-
DAY, Sept. 9, 1996, at 1D (quoting former American College of Emergency Physicians
President, Dr. Larry Bedard, saying, “I feel a lot of trepidation when I am faced with a
situation where a woman says, ‘Please don’t report, because if you do, my husband will
kill me.”’).
261 Rodriguez et al., supra note 252, at 577. R
262
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11160–11162 (West 2013).
263 See Gielen et al., supra note 253, at 283. See generally Mia M. McFarlane, R
Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence: An Inappropriate Response for New York
Health Care Professionals, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1998–1999) (explaining how
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2. Abrogating “Failure to Protect” Laws Regarding Exposure to
Domestic Violence
Child abuse reporting statutes are based on the State’s interest in pro-
tecting children from harm,264 but “there is scant evidence that mandatory
child abuse reporting statutes have any effect on protecting children.”265
Many states do not adequately define what behaviors constitute abuse and
neglect,266 and vague definitions have caused the over-reporting of abuse and
neglect, unnecessary state intrusion, and the needless removal of children
from their non-abusive parent.267
Ambiguities abound about the effect on children of witnessing abuse,268
and studies have shown that experiencing abuse does not compromise the
abuse survivor’s ability to parent.269 Evan Stark has noted that “battered
mothers enter the CPS caseload largely, if not exclusively, because of their
partners’ abusive behavior.”270 When failing to protect a child from being
exposed to domestic violence is included in a state’s definition of neglect,
battered mothers are often criminally prosecuted, charged with failing to
protect their children from being exposed to domestic violence, and face
termination of their parental rights because these mothers are per se assumed
to be unfit parents.271 “Failure to protect” laws are particularly problematic
mandatory reporting by health professionals often jeopardizes victims’ safety, and pro-
posing alternative responses).
264 See Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confi-
dentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (1998) (noting
that every state had a reporting statute by 1967).
265 Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Salt in the Wounds: Why Attorneys Should Not Be
Mandated Reporters of Child Abuse, 36 N.M. L. REV. 125, 139 n.87 (2006).
266 Id. at 142.
267 Id. at 142–43 n.105; see also THE “FAILURE TO PROTECT” WORKING GROUP,
N.Y.C INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Charging Battered
Mothers with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849,
857 (2000) (explaining that removing children from the non-violent parent has “severe
and long-lasting effects on the family” and often re-victimizes children and increases
their fear of abandonment).
268 Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload: Devel-
oping an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 107, 130 (2002) (arguing that
indirect and direct risks to children in domestic violence cases are typically non-emergent
and rarely rise to the level normally associated with abuse and neglect).
269 Id. at 111 (finding that there is no evidence that battered women’s ability to parent
is compromised as a result of the abuse); Cris M. Sullivan et al., Beyond Searching for
Deficits: Evidence that Physically and Emotionally Abused Women Are Nurturing Par-
ents, 2 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 51, 51, 61–62 (2000) (reporting on a study of battered
women in shelters that used multi-variant techniques and concluding that “mothers’ expe-
rience of physical and emotional abuse had no direct impact on their level of parenting
stress or use of discipline with their children”).
270 Stark, supra note 268, at 112. R
271 See id. at 108; THE “FAILURE TO PROTECT” WORKING GROUP, supra note 267, at R
849; see, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D)–(E) (West 2014) (“The court may
order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child
to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-
being of the child . . . [or has] engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
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because they do not penalize the abusive parent, but instead blame the
abused parent and separate non-abusive caretakers from their children.272
Under such regimes, children are frequently removed from the non-abusive
parent and placed in foster care, although the harms of separation from a
non-abusive parent are well established and children often face physical and
sexual abuse and neglect in foster care.273 As discussed in Part II, women of
color and parents with limited economic resources have particularly been
targeted under “failure to protect” laws.274 It is paradoxical that abuse survi-
vors can lose custody of their children at the point they seek help escaping
violence and are treated as culpable as the batterer.275
Rather than pitting the child welfare system against the abuse victim
when he or she seeks relief from abuse, the “failure to protect” from expo-
sure to domestic violence definition of neglect should be abrogated from
abuse and neglect laws. At a minimum, other scholars have recommended
that the strict liability application be replaced with an objective test that con-
siders the particular situation of the abuse victim’s life and circumstances,
and affirmative defenses should also be instituted.276 State efforts should fo-
cus on increasing material resources to abuse survivors and their children,
enhancing safety for those who have experienced abuse, supporting survi-
vors’ autonomy and decision-making, ending victim-blaming strategies of
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being
of the child . . . .”).
272 In states with “failure to protect” laws, this practice continues to be commonplace
even after the widely publicized class action brought on behalf of battered mothers in
New York in 2000 who had been charged with child neglect and had their children re-
moved from their care solely because the mothers had experienced abuse. See Nicholson
v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2002).
273 Emily Buss, Parents’ Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 439
(1996) (finding that the child welfare system plays out abysmally for children, often
exposing them to neglect, physical violence, and sexual abuse); Shana Gruskin, Advocate
Sues State Foster Care, Children Put at Risk, Suit Contends, SUN SENTINEL, June 15,
2000, at 1B (reporting on a state class action filed on behalf of over 14,000 children in
the Florida child welfare system, alleging beatings, sexual abuse, malnutrition, torture,
and neglect); Stark, supra note 268, at 130 (identifying that children from homes with R
domestic violence are especially vulnerable to the trauma associated with foster care
placement).
274 See generally ROBERTS, supra note 12 (discussing the child welfare system’s dis- R
ruptive, controlling influence on Black families); Appell, Protecting Children, supra note
122 (describing the State’s targeted and often punitive intrusion into families of color). R
275 Justine A. Dunlap, The “Pitiless Double Abuse” of Battered Mothers, 11 AM. U.J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 523, 552 (2003) (identifying how abused mothers “not only
bear the scars of their abuser, but they also shoulder the blame for the harms others cause
to their children”); THE “FAILURE TO PROTECT” WORKING GROUP, supra note 267, at 854 R
(“A battered mother’s attempts to protect her children, to seek services or to leave her
batterer are rarely considered. There are still strong prejudices against women who do not
leave their batterers, and the players in the child welfare system routinely blame the
victims of domestic violence for the harm to the children.”).
276 See, e.g., Enos, supra note 201, at 229–30 (proposing a “reasonableness” or ob- R
jective test).
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removing children from non-abusive parents, and maintaining the child’s re-
lationship with the non-violent parent.277
The loss of autonomy and agency inherent in mandatory reporting laws
is counter to the Family Justice Center model’s stated goal of survivor em-
powerment. Other mandatory reporting policies could be reworked, such as
those applied to safety advocates. Exceptions could be made to mandatory
reporting requirements for help-seeking circumstances to avoid discouraging
abused individuals from seeking help.278
C. Mirandize Family Justice Centers
Without proper information disclosures and counseling, a survivor is
often unaware of the potential consequences of sharing information with va-
rious agencies housed at Family Justice Centers. Furthermore, coming to a
place advertised as “safe, friendly, and confidential” can promote a false
sense of security and ability to share information unreservedly, especially in
survivors speaking with advocates, healthcare providers, and others who do
not resemble law enforcement.
As a preliminary matter, all actors who play a role in Family Justice
Centers should be trained in client-driven safety planning, which prioritizes
listening to survivors, trusts that survivors know their abusers better than
these outside agents, recognizes that safety planning has different meaning
for different individuals, and acknowledges that many survivors remain con-
nected to their batterers in some form, particularly if they have children in
common.279 Across Centers currently, intake counselors and advocates en-
gage in ad hoc, individualized practices regarding the guidance they provide.
Some advocates provide explicit warnings and halt conversations when they
sense that a survivor may provide information they would be required to
report.280 Other advocates, however, explicitly ask whether children were
present during incidents of violence and routinely make reports to Child Pro-
tective Services.281 Further problematizing the variety of approaches, re-
search on implicit bias suggests that the same individual may respond
277 See Stark, supra note 268, at 128–30. R
278
THE “FAILURE TO PROTECT” WORKING GROUP, supra note 267, at 849. R
279 See generally JILL DAVIES, ADVOCACY BEYOND LEAVING: HELPING BATTERED
WOMEN IN CONTACT WITH CURRENT OR FORMER PARTNERS (2009) (detailing the impor-
tance of engaging in client-driven safety planning).
280 Email (Feb. 14, 2015) (on file with Author).
281 The Author has observed both of these practices. State-mandated court forms for
civil protection order cases often explicitly ask whether children were present during any
incident of abuse. Advocates helping clients fill out these forms thereby receive informa-
tion they are mandated to report as child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., Washington Courts,
Court Forms, DV 1.015 Petition for Order for Protection, http://www.courts.wa.gov/
forms/?fa=forms.contribute&formID=16 [http://perma.cc/KS96-VTQS]; DV-100 Re-
quest for Domestic Violence Restraining Order, http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
dv100.pdf [http://perma.cc/RR3Z-CLHD].
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2761077
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-1\HLG104.txt unknown Seq: 51 18-MAR-16 10:46
2016] Mirandizing Family Justice 239
differently to two different clients based on subconscious racism, classism,
homophobia, or other prejudice.282
As the Family Justice Center model propagates, survivors seeking ser-
vices should be given information, counseling, and cautionary warnings
about the various service providers. Part III.C explores possible ways to en-
hance survivors’ actual understanding of options. Section 1 proposes that
Attorney Navigators be located at Family Justice Centers to counsel and as-
sist survivors as they navigate the Centers in a manner that is responsive to
survivors’ individual situations, needs, goals, and decisions. Section 2 then
explores two models for providing warnings and counseling clients. One op-
tion is to give Center clients a Miranda-type warning in an effort to promote
survivors’ autonomy and enable survivors to seek safety in an informed man-
ner. Informed consent is another apt model, which may more readily en-
hance survivors’ agency than a Miranda-type warning would. Given the
status quo’s lack of institutional oversight and attention to survivor auton-
omy and informed decision-making, any of the solutions suggested herein
would improve the current system.
1. The Attorney Navigator Solution
To produce real understanding and choice, civil attorneys trained in the
dynamics of domestic violence and in client-centered lawyering could help
survivors navigate Family Justice Centers. Unlike many of the other actors at
Family Justice Centers, civil attorneys are not typically mandatory report-
ers.283 State rules of professional responsibility permit attorneys to report
confidential communications only in extremely limited situations; for exam-
ple, attorneys may disclose information related to client representation “to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”284 Although
attorney-client privilege is typically preserved, several states have made at-
torneys mandatory reporters of child abuse285 and approximately fifteen
states require “all persons” or “everyone” to report child abuse.286 The mi-
282 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Deci-
sionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2008) (exploring the effect of im-
plicit bias on legal decision-making, with an emphasis on the way in which stereotypes
subconsciously influence the way people perceive and remember testimony).
283 See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3 (2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3RT5-MUUD] (describing the attorney-client privilege and identifying
non-governmental attorneys’ roles as separate from mandatory reporters).
284
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
285 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2014) (“Any attorney . . . having rea-
sonable cause to suspect that a child is a neglected child or an abused child, shall cause an
oral report to be made immediately. . .”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(c) (West
2015) (“The requirement to report . . . applies without exception to an individual whose
personal communications may otherwise be privileged, including an attorney . . . .”).
286
ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(a) (2014) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals
“or any person called upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child” when child
abuse is known or suspected); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2014) (mandatory report-
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nority of states that mandate such reporting by attorneys should repeal these
provisions because reporting by attorneys creates challenges for the legal
representation and defense of battered individuals by compromising trust,
communications, and confidentiality; infringing on the client’s constitutional
rights; and creating danger to domestic violence victims and their children.287
Attorney Navigators stationed at Family Justice Centers could be
trained in client-centered lawyering, the model recommended for lawyering
in general288 and deemed particularly valuable when representing abuse sur-
vivors because of how it encourages client empowerment.289 Client-centered
lawyering views clients as “autonomous ‘owners’ of their problems” who
are in the best position to assess the consequences of possible solutions and
the risks involved.290 The theory of client-centered lawyering maintains that
most clients are capable and desirous of making decisions about their lives
and actively participating in efforts to solve their problems.291 Client-cen-
tered attorneys working with abuse survivors aim to learn their clients’ iden-
ing by specified healing arts professionals and “any other person”); FLA. STAT. § 39.201
(2014) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals, not including clergy, and by any
person who suspects child abuse or neglect); IDAHO CODE § 16-1605 (2014) (mandatory
reporting by specified professionals and “other person[s]” who suspect child abuse);
IND. CODE § 31-33-5-1 (2014) (mandatory reporting by any “individual”); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (West 2014) (mandatory reporting by any person who knows or
has reasonable cause to believe a child is abused, including specific steps that some pro-
fessionals must take); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (2014) (mandatory reporting by speci-
fied professionals and other persons with reasonable cause to suspect child abuse); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2014) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals or
any other person having reason to suspect that a child has been abused or neglected); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-1–8:10 (West 2014) (requiring everyone to report child abuse); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2014) (mandatory reporting by any person or institution that sus-
pects child abuse); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101 (2013) (requiring enumerated
individuals and any “other person” to report and stating that “no privilege or contract
shall relieve any person from the requirement of reporting”); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-3
(2015) (mandatory reporting by any person); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2014)
(mandatory reporting by any person who has knowledge of abuse); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-4a-403 (West 2014) (mandatory reporting by any person); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-
3-205 (2014) (mandatory reporting by any person).
287 See Brooke Albrandt, Note, Turning in the Client: Mandatory Child Abuse Re-
porting Requirements and the Criminal Defense of Battered Women, 81 TEX. L. REV.
655, 672–73 (2002); Lockie, supra note 265, at 159. R
288 Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 370–71 (2006); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 2015 (“In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may
be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
289 Stoever, supra note 91, at 496–98; see also V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, R
Who’s Listening? Introducing Students to Client-Centered, Client-Empowering, and Mul-
tidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 83, 94 (2002)
(“Client empowerment . . . begins with a client–centered analysis of the problem
presented, so that the advocate—whether a lawyer or other provider—sees the problem
through the client’s eyes and is therefore in a position to assist the client in addressing her
problem the way she deems best.”).
290
DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH 4–7 (2d ed. 2004).
291 Id. at 8.
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tification of the problem and the clients’ goals, maximize their clients’
options, explore legal avenues and alternatives beyond the law to address
survivors’ needs, and work collaboratively with clients in an empowering
fashion to achieve their clients’ goals in the manner clients deem best.292
The principles that inform client-centered legal representation of abuse
survivors have been noted to be “at odds with much of mainstream domestic
violence law and policy, which stresses the importance of state interven-
tion.”293 The central role of law enforcement, prosecution, and other state
interventions in Family Justice Centers particularly necessitates the presence
of attorneys who practice client-centered lawyering to support survivors’
voices and autonomy as they seek help and strive to achieve their goals.
The Attorney Navigator’s role would be an advice and counseling role,
rather than a full-service holistic model of representation.294 The survivor
could tell his or her full story to the Attorney Navigator without concern for
potential collateral consequences. This storytelling process is often empow-
ering in and of itself.295 The Attorney Navigator could then advise the survi-
vor regarding the intricacies of mandatory reporting and the roles of the
various actors at the Center, such as the difference between a safety advocate
employed by a local domestic violence advocacy agency and an advocate
associated with the prosecutor’s office. The Attorney Navigator could also
counsel the survivor about the potential consequences of telling parts of his
or her story to the different actors in the Family Justice Center. Survivors
may otherwise be unwittingly coerced by law enforcement and prosecution
into providing information without understanding the resulting effects. Infor-
mation from an Attorney Navigator about the criminal justice consequences
of making a police report and the fact that the prosecutor is not the survivor’s
attorney can address this problem.
Attorneys influence how people understand their rights and options.296
Attorney Navigators could identify legal options in addition to the traditional
292 Leigh Goodmark, Clinical Cognitive Dissonance: The Values and Goals of Do-
mestic Violence Clinics, the Legal System, and the Students Caught in the Middle, 20 J.L.
& POL’Y 301, 304–05 (2012); Lois H. Kanter et al., Northeastern’s Domestic Violence
Institute: The Law School Clinic as an Integral Partner in a Coordinated Community
Response to Domestic Violence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 359, 365 (2001); Stoever, supra note
91, at 496–98. R
293 Goodmark, supra note 292, at 302. R
294 Full representation is the ideal and is not to be discouraged. The design of an
Attorney Navigator is intended to permit an attorney to be stationed at a Family Justice
Center to provide counsel to all people coming to the Family Justice Center. With greater
funding and more attorneys, more expansive representation could be possible.
295 Stoever, supra note 59, at 1192–93 (describing the therapeutic benefit of R
storytelling).
296
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015)
(“As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s
legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications.”); see also DAVID
NEUBAUER & STEVEN MEINHOLD, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, COURTS, AND POLITICS IN
THE UNITED STATES 135 (2012) (identifying the importance of the lawyer’s role in coun-
seling and advising clients about the law); Coralie Chun Matayoshi, Reinventing Our
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civil protection order or criminal restraining orders, which might otherwise
be presented as the only legal tools available. Based on survivors’ specific
circumstances and various systemic problems, the survivor may benefit from
other family law,297 housing,298 employment,299 public benefits,300 tort,301 civil
rights,302 immigration,303 or other legal remedies. Other actors in the Family
Justice Center would lack the expertise to advise about this variety of legal
options, and an attorney could provide immediate counsel to address a range
of pressing situations.
By providing guidance at an early stage, the Attorney Navigator could
head off unintended state involvement. Abused individuals are often thrust
into the legal system when police officers or Child Protective Services work-
ers instruct them to file for a protection order or restraining order without
presenting them with other legal and non-legal options.304 Further, research
shows that abuse victims are highly unlikely to have legal representation.305
Profession—Attorneys as Caring Problem Solvers, 2 HAW. B.J. 4, 11 (1998) (explaining
how informing people of their legal rights and encouraging them to be a part of a solution
to their legal problem promotes equality and produces more desirable outcomes).
297 See generally Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy:
Moving Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220
(2011) (describing the importance of providing holistic services to abuse survivors).
298 See Erik Eckholm, Victims’ Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2013, at A1.
299 See Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of
State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
669, 680 (2008); see, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 230–230.1 (West 2014).
300 See Rachel J. Gallagher, Welfare Reform’s Inadequate Implementation of the Fam-
ily Violence Option: Exploring the Dual Oppression of Poor Domestic Violence Victims,
19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 987, 996 (2011).
301 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 65–66 (2010); Carey, supra note 32, at 695–96; Douglas R
D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543, 573–74
(1992); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 123–28
(2001).
302 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.4 (2003), amended by 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch.
202 (West).
303 See generally Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan, Offering A Helping Hand:
Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 95 (2002) (explaining the effects of law and policy on
immigrant victims of domestic violence).
304 Stoever, supra note 40, at 346. R
305 Priya Outar, 2004 Watch OFP Report 3 (Oct. 15, 2004), https://watchmn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/WATCH-Final-PDF-OFP-Report-2004.pdf [http://perma.cc/
E59Y-QL38]. Following the 1963 Supreme Court decision Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), which held that criminal defendants are entitled to counsel, many attor-
neys, scholars, and advocates have called for a “civil Gideon” similarly to provide all
civil litigants with the right to counsel. William H. Neukom, An Investment in Our Fu-
ture: Adequate Legal Services Corp. Funding Will Alleviate Poverty-Related Problems,
94 A.B.A. J. 9, 9 (April 2008). For example, in 2006, the American Bar Association
adopted a “civil Gideon” policy supporting a right to counsel in civil cases where basic
human needs are at stake. Id. Although numerous obstacles exist to achieving “civil
Gideon,” many in the legal profession have advocated prioritizing the right to counsel for
low-income individuals whose basic human needs, such as safety, are at stake. For exam-
ple, Beverly Balos argues that victims of domestic violence have a right to appointed
counsel under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Russell Engler
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Research also shows that abuse survivors who are represented are more
likely to have favorable outcomes, and represented survivors obtain legal
relief that more effectively responds to their situations, including court or-
ders that include comprehensive relief tailored to survivors’ particular safety
needs.306 Using Attorney Negotiators would be a preliminary and much-
needed way to begin to address the general dearth of legal representation and
counsel for domestic violence survivors. Family Justice Centers could, how-
ever, expand on the Attorney Navigator’s purview and prioritize civil attor-
neys as partners in the same vein as criminal justice actors.
The recommendation of Attorney Navigators naturally requires funds,
but the importance of this role justifies the expense. Initial legal counseling
through Attorney Navigators could actually produce cost savings by obviat-
ing future legal problems and expenses. The role of an Attorney Navigator
also seems necessary to achieve Family Justice Centers’ stated goals of survi-
vor empowerment and accountability to survivors.307 Trained pro bono coun-
sel, legal aid attorneys, law school clinics, or retired civil attorneys could be
recruited and utilized as Attorney Navigators. Because the proposed limited
advising and counseling role does not carry with it intensive and unpredict-
able litigation demands, the Attorney Navigator role would be easier to staff
than other forms of legal representation. When considering the volume of
criminal justice actors in a Family Justice Center, having an Attorney Navi-
gator present is a minimal expense that provides significant benefits.
2. Mechanisms for Achieving Understanding
a. Miranda and the Family Justice Center
The counseling and cautionary warnings suggested by this Article
hearken back to the Supreme Court’s language of and intent in creating the
Miranda warning, with this Article advising that survivors be warned that
they have a right to remain silent and that anything they say to actors within
a Family Justice Center can be used against them or their families.
Family Justice Centers exist to promote and facilitate safety, not to
serve as arms of the criminal justice system. Using a Miranda-like system,
survivors appearing at Family Justice Centers could be made immune from
maintains that the power imbalance in domestic violence cases strengthens the need for a
“civil Gideon.” Balos, supra note 28, at 557; Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based R
Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
697, 712 (2006). A true “civil Gideon” providing a right to representation would require
substantial resources and be aided by the reversal of Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), in which the Court ruled (5–4) that the Constitution does
not guarantee a right to counsel in civil cases.
306
PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION OR-
DERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 19 (1990) (finding,
also, that litigants in domestic violence cases with attorneys are more likely to be
successful).
307 Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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prosecution for disclosures made while seeking help. This solution encour-
ages disclosure by survivors so that actors can provide survivor-centered
safety options, instead of operating as a governmental investigatory tool. The
exclusionary rule is the enforcement mechanism for Miranda.308 Analo-
gously, the exclusionary rule could also be applied regarding information
gained at Family Justice Centers in the absence of voluntary and valid con-
sent.309 This could be applied as an advisory “best practice;” as a statutory
privilege that applies to Family Justice Centers, similar to how communica-
tions during negotiations and mediations are privileged;310 or as a court-en-
forced exclusionary rule. The possibility of a cause of action for using
information gained without adequate disclosure could also be explored, al-
though the U.S. Supreme Court has held that there cannot be civil suits for
violation of Miranda’s requirements.311
The Court in Miranda was concerned with the inherently coercive na-
ture of custodial interrogation, and thus required that every suspect who is
questioned by police while in custody be given certain warnings.312 Miranda
warnings were intended to “afford custodial suspects an informed and unfet-
tered choice between speech and silence and, at the same time, prevent in-
voluntary statements.”313 To achieve this aim, the Supreme Court held that:
[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the pres-
ence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.314
308 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
309 The Court in Miranda explained the exclusionary remedy:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. . . . Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in
violation of these rules may not be admitted against the accused, at least during
the State’s case in chief.
Id.; Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
310 See FED. R. EVID. 408 (protecting settlement discussions from subsequent disclo-
sure in court).
311 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772–73 (2003).
312 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, 469.
313 Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1521
(2008); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (discussing the cases underlying Miranda and noting
that in each, the defendant when questioned was “cut off from the outside world. In none
of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the
outset of the interrogation process. . . . They all thus share salient features – incommuni-
cado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-in-
criminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.”).
314 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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Miranda’s familiar warnings and waivers have become “part of our national
culture,”315 and police officers often even give Miranda warnings in noncus-
todial interrogation settings when the warning is not technically required.316
Miranda has been heralded for providing clear guidance to law enforce-
ment about the procedures to follow and the warning to administer, and the
subsequent admissibility of any confession.317 Simultaneously, Miranda
warnings have been criticized as being ineffective. Scholars have argued that
(1) the warnings fail to cure the inherently coercive nature of custodial inter-
rogation,318 (2) Miranda can be circumvented in multiple ways,319 and (3)
subsequent judicial decisions have weakened Miranda’s original protec-
tions.320 Police have been found to use intimidation, isolation, and trickery to
obtain consent,321 and police manuals reveal how police are encouraged to
315 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); see also Frederick Schauer,
The Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 155 (2013) (identifying Miranda as possi-
bly “the most famous appellate case in the world,” and noting how Miranda is invoked
internationally, even in countries without similar requirements).
316 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 882 (1996) (identify-
ing that officers in a special victims unit Mirandized almost every person they inter-
viewed, sometimes even “when not required to do so”).
317 In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979), the Court declared:
Miranda’s holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with speci-
ficity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of inform-
ing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such
interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which benefits the ac-
cused and the State alike, has been thought to outweigh the burdens that the deci-
sion in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring
the suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence even though the
confession might be voluntary under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis.
Cf. Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension
and Coverage, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 177 (2007) (evaluating the wording of Miranda
warnings used by 560 jurisdictions across the United States and identifying the levels of
reading comprehension required to understand the different components of the Miranda
warning).
318 Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1013–14 (2001).
319 Richard A. Leo, The Impact of “Miranda” Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 621, 632 (1996) (“[A]fter initially adjusting to the new rules propounded in the
Miranda decision, police complied with the letter, but not the spirit, of the required four-
fold warnings.”).
320 See e.g., Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1188–91 (2012) (holding that an incar-
cerated individual was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, and that police officers
do not need to Mirandize prison inmates prior to questioning them about events unrelated
to their present incarceration); see also Leo, supra note 319, at 622 (“The Supreme R
Court’s confession decisions since 1966 have steadily chipped away both at the letter and
the spirit of Miranda.”); Weisselberg, supra note 313, at 1521 (“In the more than four R
decades since Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court has effectively encouraged police
practices that have gutted Miranda’s safeguards, to the extent those safeguards ever truly
existed.”).
321 John D. King, Coercion, Consent, Compassion, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 823,
824–25 (2013).
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use coercive interrogation practices, evading the intent of Miranda.322 Con-
fessions have generally been upheld if certain formalistic requirements of
Miranda are met, with allegiance to formalism over true voluntary
consent.323
Studies on the efficacy of Miranda warnings have shown that the warn-
ings frequently fail to protect those who are most vulnerable to coercion by
the police because even when the warnings are issued, they are not compre-
hensible to many suspects.324 Suspects often do not possess the educational
level needed to understand the warnings, and significant portions of
juveniles and individuals with disabilities fail to understand the Miranda
warnings altogether.325 Researchers have concluded that “reading form
warnings . . . does not effectively communicate rights or ensure that a waiver
is knowing and intelligent.”326 The requirement that invocations of Miranda
rights must be unambiguous presents another challenge to accessing rights,
as there is no agreement as to what constitutes the unambiguous invocation
of rights, and certain populations are disproportionately deemed to have in-
sufficiently invoked their rights. Indirect, hedged, polite, or softened speech
such as, “Maybe I shouldn’t say anything,” is more likely to be used by
“powerless” groups, including persons of color, women, and individuals of
lower socio-economic status.327 Their requests to remain silent or to have
counsel are disproportionately frequently interpreted as ambiguous and
insufficient.328
Naturally, differences exist between triggers for Miranda—a court-
mandated constitutional device containing warnings that must be given to a
criminal suspect in “custodial interrogation”329—and the situation of an
abuse survivor who voluntarily comes to a Family Justice Center.330 The sur-
vivor who seeks help from a Center is free to leave and is not in custody or
322 Weisselberg, supra note 313, at 1522 (surveying California police manuals and R
revealing practices that evade the intent of Miranda warnings). In a tactic referred to as
“questioning outside Miranda,” when warnings are given gratuitously and officers con-
tinue interrogation despite the suspect’s invocation of the right to silence or counsel,
courts have concluded that because the warning was not actually required, the officers
were therefore not under a duty to cease questioning. See, e.g., Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778
F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1985).
323 King, supra note 321, at 824–25. R
324 Leo, supra note 319, at 633. R
325 Weisselberg, supra note 313, at 1577. R
326 Id.
327 Joshua I. Hammack, Turning Miranda Right Side Up: Post-Waiver Invocations
and the Need to Update the Miranda Warnings, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 421, 438
(2013).
328 See Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1011, 1056–57 (2007) (showing how, of twenty-eight cases involving female suspects
who invoked their Miranda rights, the female suspects’ requests were deemed ambibuous
in twenty-one of those cases).
329 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–75, 498.
330 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973) (holding that
searches are permissible without probable cause or a warrant if there is voluntary consent,
which obviates the need for Miranda warnings).
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being interrogated, at least at the outset. Clients at a Family Justice Center
are not under an obligation to meet with personnel or receive services, with
some exceptions, such as having an appointment due to a Child Protective
Services’ investigation.331
Miranda warnings have been observed to create a “minimum though
not necessarily sufficient condition for an informed decision.”332 There are
ways in which Centers might provide the appearance of full disclosure, but
without meaningful understanding from clients; this is inadequate in an envi-
ronment that intends in part to empower and increase the autonomy of
survivors.
Despite the critiques of Miranda, warning systems in a Family Justice
Center may actually be more effective than in a custodial context for which
officers are trained to elicit confessions from suspects they believe are guilty
of crimes. Even police in a Family Justice Center are likely not seeking a
victim’s confession to a crime; instead, any incriminating statements they
receive would be ancillary to their helping goals. Building on the idea of
communicating options and cautions, the model of informed consent, ex-
plored in the next section, may better promote informed decision-making
and support survivors’ autonomy, with communication that can be more in-
teractive and designed to achieve understanding meaningfully.
Along with ensuring that survivors understand the warnings, a chal-
lenge is to make sure that survivors who receive the warnings can obtain
needed services, rather than being dissuaded from getting safety, medical,
and legal help. Counseling can occur with this goal in mind to help survivors
understand which actors are mandatory reporters, what information prompts
reports, and what services should be available regardless of or without dis-
closing the triggering information. The informed consent model could ide-
ally achieve the desired combination of information and services while
avoiding a deprivation of services based on fear.
b. Informed Consent
Informed consent—a concept guided by the fields of medical and re-
search ethics—is primarily a practice in bioethics, clinical care, and research
participation whereby individuals are provided with information and a
description of potential risks, benefits, and alternatives to enable them to
make educated, voluntary choices.333 The practice has been utilized in a vari-
ety of contexts; for example, family law application includes the informed
consent necessary to enter into mediation.334 Informed consent has been re-
331 Gwinn et al., supra note 4, at 103. R
332 Weisselberg, supra note 313, at 1564. R
333 Karl Desch et al., Analysis of Informed Consent Document Utilization in a Mini-
mal-Risk Genetic Study, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 316, 316 (2011).
334 See, e.g., MONT. R. APP. P. (7)(2)(b) (2015) (excluding domestic violence cases
from appellate mediation, unless the abuse victim provides informed consent); see also
Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Family Mediation After Hendershott: The Case for Uniform Do-
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ferred to as an “operationalized form of self-determination,” which pro-
motes individuals’ decisions about what happens to them and is key to
“sustaining or achieving autonomy.”335 The model thus encourages individu-
als voluntarily to make decisions affecting their lives based on their own
morals and values.336 Elements of informed consent from the client’s or pa-
tient’s perspective include receiving information and disclosures, under-
standing the implications or consequences of an action, having decision-
making capacity, and voluntarily making choices.337
Attorney Navigators could provide information and guidance about the
various agencies and actors at Family Justice Centers, including how they
can assist the survivor and the implications of interacting with each. To
achieve actual understanding through informed consent, the mode of com-
municating information, options, and potential consequences in a trauma-
informed and empowering way is crucial to consider.
Consider forms. The use of forms ensures that all clients are provided
with the same information, yet the practice fails to account for literacy levels
or to provide contextualized information and counseling to individuals in
crisis. An overload of forms, though facially addressing the problem, is not
an optimal design to increase agency, autonomy, and empowerment for
abuse survivors. With so many actors in a Family Justice Center, survivors
could feel inundated with disclosures and fail to understand any of them.338
Multiple studies have shown that when people are presented with consent
forms, they rarely read them and instead sign them without knowing the
mestic Violence Screening and Opt-in Provision in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 273, 304
(2013) (discussing how abuse survivors are required to provide informed consent for
mediation to proceed). See generally Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Medi-
ation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
775 (1999) (recommending requirements to help parties make informed choices about
mediation).
335 Berta M. Schrems, Informed Consent, Vulnerability and the Risk of Group-Spe-
cific Attribution, 21 NURSING ETHICS 829, 830 (2014). See generally RUTH R. FADEN &
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (discussing
how informed consent is rooted in the ethical principle of autonomy).
336 Schrems, supra note 335, at 829. R
337 Alex Cahana & Samia A. Hurst, Voluntary Informed Consent in Research and
Clinical Care: An Update, 8 PAIN PRACTICE 446, 446 (2008); see also COUNCIL FOR INT’L
ORGS. OF MED. SCIS., International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involv-
ing Human Subjects 32 (2002), http://www.cioms.ch/publications/layout_guide2002.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9FUU-59YT] (“Informed consent is a decision to participate in re-
search, taken by a competent individual who has received the necessary information; who
has adequately understood the information; and who, after considering the information,
has arrived at a decision without having been subjected to coercion, undue influence or
inducement, or intimidation.”).
338 See Victor Ali, Note, Consent Forms as Part of the Informed Consent Process:
Moving Away from “Medical Miranda”, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1575, 1578 (2003)
(“[C]onsent forms are often used to inundate the patient with legally required informa-
tion, without regard to the usefulness of this approach in increasing the patient’s level of
understanding.”).
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terms of their agreement,339 and the length of informed consent documents
correlates with decreased understanding and participation.340 Although court
forms for seeking domestic violence protection orders are designed to be
used by unrepresented individuals, studies show that some abuse survivors
are unable to seek civil protection orders because of the number and com-
plexity of forms required.341 Disclosure forms therefore cannot be relied on
to ensure or even increase understanding.
A review of the Family Justice Center Alliance website reveals model
forms and best practices for obtaining consent to share information across
agencies.342 These forms enable the flow of information, but do not provide
warnings about the implications of sharing the information. They appear de-
signed solely to encourage disclosure.
The key to increasing understanding is improving the process, rather
than the forms.343 Human interaction is necessary to meet the needs of abuse
survivors, particularly given the variety of circumstances, traumas, vulnera-
bilities, and resources with which people appear at Family Justice Centers.
Providing the time and space to discuss possibilities, tailor options, and re-
spond to questions improves understanding and permits responses to be per-
sonalized to a survivor’s actual experience of abuse, rather than promoting a
one-size-fits-all response based on a stock story of domestic violence that
may not address an individual’s needs.344 Domestic violence responses must
continue to develop in ways that are responsive to issues of intersectionality
and multiple forms of oppression, particularly since the stock stories and
original legal responses were based on the experiences of White, heterosex-
ual, middle-class women.345
339 See, e.g., Desch et al., supra note 333, at 319 (“Our results demonstrate that most R
participants in our study (93.6%) provided consent without spending sufficient time to
thoroughly read and comprehend the informed consent document.”).
340 See id. (reporting the results of a study regarding informed consent in research
participation).
341 Stoever, supra note 59, at 1203–04 (citing Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders R
of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the
Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 171, 175 (1993)).
342 See Resources: Intake Policies, Procedures, & Forms for FJCs, FAMILY JUSTICE
CTR. ALL., http://familyjusticecenter.org/intake-policies-procedures-a-forms-for-fjcs.html
[http://perma.cc/28BA-N776].
343 Cahana & Hurst, supra note 337, at 446 (“Although improving consent forms R
does not have a clear effect on understanding, improving the consent process may
help.”); see also Michael C. Rowbotham et al., Interactive Informed Consent: Random-
ized Comparison with Paper Consents, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (2013) (finding that interac-
tive options produce higher levels of understanding than relying on forms alone).
344 See Cahana & Hurst, supra note 337, at 449 (discussing the need to provide time R
for questions and personalized responses); Stoever, supra note 59, at 1160–64 (describing R
how current laws and responses systems fail to respond to complex situations of domestic
violence, including HIV-related abuse). See generally GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note
19 (identifying the need to return to the roots of the battered women’s movement to R
provide more individualized responses to domestic violence).
345 Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)course: Moving from
White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1068 (2006)
(“Domestic violence legal discourse is racialized as white and thus fails to adequately
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Under the informed consent framework, a person must have the facul-
ties to understand and make conscious decisions once he or she has received
adequate information about the options and possible consequences of vari-
ous choices. Any consideration of decision-making capacity should avoid a
group-wide attribution of vulnerability or incapacity, such as the assumption
that abuse victims are unable to act in their best interests.346 The multiple
vulnerabilities that could affect capacity, however, may include youth; liter-
acy or education level; the experience of abuse, trauma, or injury; or being
chronically ill.347 Some factors can be addressed through providing addi-
tional helping services. For example, clients who are deaf or who have lim-
ited English proficiency can utilize interpreters and translators,348 and minors
can be assigned counsel.349
While informed consent requires that individuals have the “opportunity
to decide voluntarily free of external control,”350 opportunities for self-deter-
mination or decision-making may be further limited by context, situational
concepts, or other factors that restrict options and make individuals vulnera-
ble.351 For example, someone critically in need of medical treatment may
lack the option to refuse care. A critical examination of context and the
extent to which an abuse survivor is dependent on the service provider for
basic needs for the survivor and his or her children can reveal the lack of real
choice. If there is limited access to services outside of the Family Justice
Center complex, refusal may not produce alternative options. Attention
should also be given to whether clients experience real or perceived pressure
to participate in services and to speak with certain governmental or commu-
nity actors. Such clients may have concerns about the implication of refusing
to communicate with such actors or the inability to withdraw from an inter-
action that has begun.
respond to the needs of women of color who are victimized by intimate abuse.”); see also
Crenshaw, supra note 59, at 1242. R
346 See Michael Vargas, Prosecuting Domestic Violence After Giles: Why a Categori-
cal Approach to the Forfeiture Doctrine Threatens Female Autonomy, 20 DUKE J. GEN-
DER L. & POL’Y 173, 186 (2012) (discussing situations of victims not wanting to press
charges and identifying that “the state presumes that a victim of domestic violence can
never provide informed consent because the consent is believed to have been compelled
by fear, coercion, or involuntariness”).
347 See Melinda Wolbransky et al., Collecting Informed Consent with Juvenile Justice
Populations: Issues and Implications for Research, 31 BEHAV. SCI. L. 457, 471–72
(2013). Cf. Neil Levy, Forced to Be Free? Increasing Patient Autonomy by Constraining
It, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 1, 6–7 (2014) (citing limitations in making good choices and argu-
ing in favor of constraining the informed consent procedure in medical settings to permit
doctors to limit options and engage in “directive” or “confrontational” counseling). See
generally Amulya Mandava et al., The Quality of Informed Consent: Mapping the Land-
scape, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 356 (2012) (evaluating comprehension and voluntariness in
studies across countries).
348 See Morrison, supra note 345, at 1112 (identifying the need for interpreters in R
domestic violence agencies); see also Lemon, supra note 59, at 40–42. R
349 See Martin, supra note 222, at 509. R
350 Schrems, supra note 335, at 831. R
351 Id. at 829.
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Although various ethical and practical challenges arise in seeking to
attain actual understanding through informed consent, utilizing an interactive
method of informed consent is more likely to achieve genuine understanding
and choice than a Miranda-style warning alone. Informed consent can also
be more therapeutic, individualized, and trauma-informed than a blanket
warning; these benefits of informed consent are critical considerations in
responding to abuse survivors and individuals in crisis.352 To actualize the
intent of Family Justice Centers to both promote safety and empower abuse
victims, Centers could work in multiple ways to prioritize survivor self-de-
termination and autonomy, along with safety, especially because increased
autonomy is associated with improved safety outcomes.353
CONCLUSION
Some scholars and domestic violence advocates have disavowed formal
criminal and civil justice system responses, turning instead to restorative jus-
tice practices.354 While this is a promising area to explore and develop, the
reality is that the Family Justice Center model is rapidly multiplying nation-
ally and globally.355
At Family Justice Centers currently, the State, even in well-intentioned
endeavors, routinely reinforces and even generates vulnerability, rather than
engaging in empowerment. Race, class, gender, and victimization axes of
identity make some individuals particularly vulnerable to state intrusion and
control.356 Exploring the ways that Family Justice Centers may unintention-
ally reassert and replicate control, deny survivors autonomy, and create other
352 See generally Denise E. Elliott et al., Trauma-Informed or Trauma-Denied: Prin-
ciples and Implementation of Trauma-Informed Services for Women, 33 J. COMMUNITY
PSYCH. 461 (2005) (identifying how trauma symptoms arising from past experiences of
violence often create an impediment to survivor recovery, and how the efficacy of social
services is enhanced through a trauma-informed approach); Margaret Gatz et al., Effec-
tiveness of an Integrated, Trauma-Informed Approach to Treating Women with Co-Occur-
ring Disorders and Histories of Trauma: The Los Angeles Site Experience, 35 J.
COMMUNITY PSYCH. 863 (2007) (describing a study in which women who received
trauma-informed therapy demonstrated better treatment retention over three months than
those who did not).
353 Stoever, supra note 91, at 498–99. R
354 See Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Nav-
ajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 101–07 (2000); C. Quince Hopkins, Tempering
Idealism with Realism: Using Restorative Justice Processes to Promote Acceptance of
Responsibility in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 311,
353–55 (2012); Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understand-
ing? Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 517, 576–94 (2010).
355 See, e.g., Les Blumenthal, Family Justice Center Wins Federal Funding; A Fund-
ing Bill for the Justice Department Includes $1.3 Million for a Tacoma-Pierce County
Domestic Violence Center, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 2005, at B1.
356 See generally Bach, supra note 74 (contrasting the supportive state and hyper- R
regulatory state, and emphasizing aspects of identity that make individuals more vulnera-
ble to hyperregulation).
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consequences and contradictions can illuminate what measures should be
taken to enhance survivors’ safety and options while avoiding producing an
assembly line “one-size-fits-all” form of justice that decreases agency and
safety. The Family Justice Center model has created new hazards that blame,
punish, or increase risk to abuse survivors, but these same systems can be
critically reworked to mitigate the potential for damage and to move forward
based on principles of respect for autonomy, justice, independence, and the
dignity and integrity of those who have experienced abuse.
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APPENDIX A: FAMILY JUSTICE CENTERS WITH CONFIDENTIALITY CLAIMS
Center and Website Description
Northeast Region
“They are our core values and areFamily Justice Center of Erie County grounded in zero tolerance for domestichttp://www.fjcsafe.org/ violence and absolute confidentiality for[http://perma.cc/X8EL-27PC] our clients.”
Montgomery County Family Justice
Center “Talk with a counselor confidentially”http://www.mcfjcfoundation.org/
[http://perma.cc/HUA4-5YMT]
Westchester County Family Justice
Center




The Family Justice Center of
Georgetown County “All services free and confidential”
http://www.fjcgeorgetown.org/
Family Justice Center of Ouachita
Parish “All services are free and confidential.”http://yourfjc.org
[http://perma.cc/J67K-MX7K]
“Free and Confidential Services
Available: Assistance with Emergency
Family Safety Center Inc. Protective Orders, Assistance with law
http://www.fsctulsa.org/ enforcement reports, Chaplain services,
[http://perma.cc/3WBJ-FUUL] Consultation with District Attorney staff,
Counseling referral for adults, Forensic
medical”
“Greater safety, access to services, andOne Place Family Justice Center confidentiality for victims and theirhttp://www.oneplacefjc.org/ families by co-locating services under[http://perma.cc/SE5E-A7J3] one roof”
South Region
Family Justice Center of St. Joseph “Quickly and confidentially seekCounty information, and easily accesshttp://www.fjcsjc.org/ resources”[http://perma.cc/SAA6-5T4V]
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Center and Website Description
“Information gathered and received from
victims needs to be uniformly recorded
Peoria Family Justice Center and managed to ensure optimal response
http://www.peoriacounty.org/ from victim advocates, court advocates,
familyjustice/ criminal justice system, law enforcement
[http://perma.cc/3CXK-Y2D9] and probation and offender service
personnel, while maintaining
confidentiality”
St. Paul Family Justice Center Mission statement includes “honorhttp://bridgestosafety.org/aboutus.html confidentiality”[http://perma.cc/VN96-8UPQ]
West Region
City of Phoenix Family Advocacy
Center “A safe, confidential and supportivehttp://www.acfan.net/centers/ environment”phoenix-family.htm
[http://perma.cc/K8PS-A6EL]
“All client records and information are
Crystal Judson Family Justice Center kept in the strictest of confidence.
http://www.aplaceofhelp.org/ Information will not be shared without a
[http://perma.cc/KD2D-LHLE] written release form from the client or
where legal exceptions exist.”
Family Advocacy Center & Education “Easy access to a wide scope of servicesServices - FACES in a safe, confidential, responsive andhttps://adacounty.id.gov/faces/ supportive environment”[http://perma.cc/E8XB-TBGH]
Fresno Family Justice Bureau
http://www.fresno.gov/Government/ “They provide confidential help toDepartmentDirectory/Police/ victims, family, friends and co-workersSelfHelpResources/ about domestic violence”DomesticViolence.htm
[http://perma.cc/Q35V-R5B5]
Glendale Family Advocacy Center
http://www.glendaleaz.com/ “All services are provided at no cost, in
advocacycenter/ a confidential setting.”
[http://perma.cc/9CBS-BMUE]
“The District Attorney’s Office, in
collaboration with a variety ofIndio Family Justice Center community partners, has created threehttp://www.rivcoda.org/opencms/ Family Justice Centers. FJCs are a safevictimwitness/fjc/index.html and confidential place for victims of[http://perma.cc/66LH-AVGM] domestic violence, sexual assault, and
child and elder abuse.”
Interior Alaska Center for Non-
Violent Living “24/7 Confidential Support”
http://www.iacnvl.org/ “Our services are free and confidential.”
[http://perma.cc/38W4-SJBM]
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Center and Website Description
Nampa Family Justice Center “Additionally, we keep everything you
http://www.nampafamily tell us in the strictest confidence, and
justicecenter.org/ don’t share your information without
[http://perma.cc/Q2M2-QNBP] your permission.”
Orange County Family Justice Center
www.anaheimfamilyjusticecenter.org “A safe, confidential and friendly place”
[http://perma.cc/K6RB-6NBP]
“The District Attorney’s Office, inRiverside Family Justice Center collaboration with a variety ofhttp://www.rivcoda.org/opencms/ community partners, has created threevictimwitness/fjc/index.html Family Justice Centers. FJCs are a safe[http://perma.cc/Q5EY-3DRW] and confidential place.”
Solano Family Justice Center
http://www.solanocounty.com “Confidential and non-confidential
/depts/fvp/fjc/default.asp victim advocacy”
[http://perma.cc/6NVR-9EWY]
Sweetwater County Family Justice “Your information, unless you agree thatCenter it should be shared, will be kept ashttp://www.sweetwatercountyfjc.org/ confidential as is allowed by law.”[http://perma.cc/W9G4-EDYF]
Thurston County Family Justice
Center “Help that is safe, confidential, andhttp://www.thurstoncountyfjc.org/ easily accessible”index.php
[http://perma.cc/G48L-9AGC]
West Contra Costa County Family “We uphold the confidentiality of clientJustice Center work and ensure client safety at allhttp://wccfjc.org/ times.”[http://perma.cc/62HF-8LZ6]
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